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THE DURHAM RULE AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA
ABE KRASHt
ON July 1, 1954, in Durham v. United States,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit announced a new test of respon-
sibility to be applied in all future criminal cases in the District: "[A]n ac-
cused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental
disease or defect."2 This new standard was designed to reconcile the rule of
responsibility with advances in medical knowledge, and to broaden the class
of persons who would be treated instead of punished; more particularly, it was
framed to facilitate communication between psychiatric experts and the courts
which was being impeded by the pre-existing tests. Although the Durham de-
cision has provoked extensive discussion 3 -indeed, one commentator has
observed that "Probably no criminal case of the past decade has been the sub-
ject of such widespread debate" 4-the Durham formula has been adopted in
only one other jurisdiction.5 While the test has been warmly endorsed by
tMember of the District of Columbia Bar.
I am greatly indebted for many helpful comments in connection with an earlier draft of
this article to my colleague, Abe Fortas; Professor Abraham Goldstein of the Yale Law
School; and Mrs. Howard Adler, a member of the Indiana bar.
1. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
2. Id. at 874-75.
3. The literature on the Durham rule has attained formidable proportions. See, e.g.,
Insanity and the Criminal Law-A Critique of Durham v. United States, 22 U. CHI. L.
REV. 317 (1955) ; Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law: From McNaghten to Durham
and Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793 (1955); Arnold, Due Process in Trials, 300 Annals 123
(1955) ; Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L.J. 761 (1956) ; Douglas,
The Durham Rule: A Meeting Ground for Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 41 IowA L. REv.
485 (1956); Note, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 1253 (1958); Szasz, Psychiatry, Ethics, and the
Criminal Law, 58 COLUm. L. Rav. 183 (1958) ; Symposium, Mental Disease and Criminal
Responsibility, 5 CATHOLIC LAW. 3 (1959); Watson, Durham Plus Five Years: Develop-
menit of the Law of Criminal Responsibility in the District of Columbia, 116 Am. J. Psy-
cHiATRY 289 (1959) ; Report of Committee on Criminal Responsibility, 26 J.D.C. BAR
Ass'N 301 (1959) ; Reid, Understanding the New Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal In-
sanity, 69 YALE L.J. 367 (1960) ; Halleck, The Insanity Defense it the District of Colum-
bia-A Legal Lorelei, 49 GEo. L.J. 294 (1960); Bazelon, The Awesome Decision, Satur-
day Evening Post, January 23, 1960, p. 32.
4. Weihofen, The "Test" of Criminal Responsibility: Recent Developments, 172 INT'L
RECORD OF MEDICINE 638 (1959).
5. See V.I CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 1, 14 (1957):
All persons are capable of committing crimes or offenses except-
(4) Persons who are mentally ill and who committed the act charged against
them in consequence of such mental illness.
The Durham decision helped to inspire reconsideration of the criminal responsibility stand-
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many psychiatrists 6 and by some individual judges, 7 it has not yet won the
approval of any other court.8
In the seven years which have elapsed since Durham was decided, an elabo-
rate corpus of precedent and practice has evolved in the District of Columbia
ranging over nearly every procedural and substantive question that can arise
in connection with the insanity problem in criminal cases. The Court of Ap-
peals has issued more than eighty opinions since July 1954 relating to judi-
cial administration of the insanity defense-an astonishing volume unmatched
ard by executive and legislative commissions in a number of states including, among others,
New York, see N.Y. Times, July 25, 1959, § E, p. 6E, col. 1; id., July 26, 1959, p. 50, col.
3; id., Aug. 4, 1959, p. 27, col. 8; id., Feb. 13, 1961, p. 29, col. 8; Maryland, see Washing-
ton Post & Times Herald, Feb. 10, J1959, p. B1, col. 6; id., June 14, 1959, p. B8, col. 1; and
Massachusetts, see 42 Mass. L.Q. No. 4, 56 (1957).
6. See, e.g., Roche, Criminality and Mental Illcss-Two Faces of the Salie Coin,
22 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 320 (1955) ; Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness,
id. at 325; Zilboorg, A Step Toward Enlghtcned Justice, id. at 331.
7. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 3; Sobeloff, supra note 3; Howard v. United States,
229 F.2d 602, 607 (5th Cir.), rev'd on rehearing en banc, 232 F.2d 274 (1956) (Rives, J.,
dissenting).
8. The Durham formula has been rejected as a standard by various federal courts.
Voss v. United States, 259 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1958) ; Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1957) ; Andersen v. United States, 237 F.2d 118,
127 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Howard v. United States, 229 F.2d 602 (5th Cir.), rev'd on rehear-
ing en banc, 232 F.2d 274 (1956) ; United States v. Hopkins, 169 F. Supp. 187, 189 (D.
Md. 1958). See also United States v. Kunak, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 346 (1954) ; United States v.
Smith, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 314 (1954).
The courts of twenty-two states have declined to follow Durham. Arizona: State v.
Crose, 357 P.2d 136 (Ariz. 1960) ; Arkansas: Downs v. State, 330 S.W.2d 281 (Ark. 1959) ;
California: People v. Ryan, 140 Cal. App. 2d 412, 425, 295 P.2d 496, 504 (Dist. Ct. App.
1956); Colorado: Early v. People, 352 P.2d 112 (Colo. 1960); Connecticut: State v.
Davies, 146 Conn. 137, 145-49, 148 A.2d 251, 255-57 (1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 921
(1959) ; Florida: Picott v. State, 116 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1959) ; Illinois: People v. Carpenter,
11111. 2d 60, 64-68, 142 N.E.2d 11, 13-15 (1957) ; Indiana: Flowers v. State, 236 Ind. 151,
139 N.E.2d 185 (1956) ; Kansas: State v. Andrews, 357 P.2d 739 (Kan. 1960) ; Maryland:
Cole v. State, 212 Md. 55, 128 A.2d 437 (1957) ; Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d
502 (1955) ; Thomas v. State, 206 Md. 575, 112 A.2d 913 (1955) ; Massachusetts: Common-
wealth v. Chester, 337 Mass. 702, 712-13, 150 N.E.2d 914, 919-20 (1958) ; Minnesota: State
v. Finn, 100-N.W.2d 508 (Minn. 1960); Missouri: State v. Goza, 317 S.W.2d 609 (Mo.
1958) ; Montana: State v. Kitchens, 129 Mont. 331, 337, 286 P.2d 1079, 1082 (1955);
Nevada: Sollars v.. State, 73 Nev.,248, 316 P.2d 917 (1957) ; New Jersey: State v. Lucas,
30 N.J. 37, 63-72, 152 A.2d 50, 64-69 (1959); New York: People.v Johnson, 169 N.Y.S.
2d 217 (Westchester County Ct. 1957) ; Ohio-; State v. Robinson, 168 N.E.2d 328 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1958) ; Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Novak, 395 Pa. 199, 150 A.2d 102 (1959) ;
Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 164 A.2d 98 (Pa. 1960)'; Utah: State v. Kirkham, 7 Utah
2d 108, 319 P.2d 859 (1958)-; Vermont: State-v. Goyet, 120 Vt. 12, 54-61, 132 A.2d 623,
650-54 (1957) ; Washington: State v. Collins, 50 Wash. 2d 740, 749-55, 314 P.2d 660, 665-
68 (1957). But cf. Anderson v. Grasberg, 247 Minn. 538, 555, 78 N.W.2d 450, 461 (1956)




by any other federal or state court.9 While the merits of the Durham test
itself have been widely argued, these subsequent opinions have not received
equivalent attention,10 although they are significant even for jurisdictions
which have rejected Durham as a standard of responsibility.
The new substantive rule of law promulgated in Durham provides a fresh
standard for assessing the defendant's responsibility as of the time of the al-
leged offense. The Durham rule is designed to be applied at the trial itself.
It regulates the presentation of evidence as to mental disorder; it is the stand-
ard of reference for medical experts and laymen who testify with respect to
the accused's mental condition; and it is the test which the trial judge directs
the jury to apply.
Like any other substantive rule, however, Durham is profoundly influenced
by its setting in the litigation process. For example, the mental condition of
the accused may have been drawn in issue long before trial by a plea that the
defendant is not competent to stand trial. The Durham test is technically ir-
relevant to the question of the defendant's fitness to stand trial. But the test
for determining capacity to stand trial-whether a defendant is so mentally
incompetent "as to be unable to understand the proceedings against him or
properly to assist in his own defense""-is intimately related in practice
to the Durham rule. Thus, the psychiatric examination, which is designed
to assist the court in determining whether the defendant is competent to
stand trial, may also encompass an investigation into whether the de-
fendant was mentally diseased as of the date of the offense.12 The psychiatric
experts who examine the accused in connection with pretrial competency
proceedings are, therefore, frequently called as witnesses to testify at the trial
concerning the accused's mental condition at the time of the offense.
Similarly, the application of the Durham rule is affected in practice by
problems concerning a defendant's mental condition which can arise subsequent
to trial. A defendant in the District who is found not guilty by reason of
insanity is automatically hospitalized in a mental institution.' 3 In order to be
9. The United States District Court in the District of Columbia is vested with general
jurisdiction over "all crimes and offenses" committed within the District. D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 11-306 (1952). Its jurisdiction thus extends to cases of a kind normally tried in state
courts, e.g., prosecutions for homicide, assault, larceny, etc., as well as to federal criminal
offenses, The D.C. Court of Appeals exercises appellate jurisdiction over all final judg-
ments of the District Court, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958), so that its appellate jurisdiction in
criminal cases is analogous in many respects to that of a state supreme court.
10. For a discussion of some post-Durham developments see Goldstein & Katz, Dan-
.erousness and Mental Illness: Some Obsermattos on the Decision to Release.-Persons
Acquitted by Reason oJ Insaniy, 70 YALE L.J. 225 (1960) ; Gasch, Prosecution Problems
Under the Durham Rule, 5 CATHOLIc LAW. 5 (1959); Note, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 1253
(1958).
11. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (a) (Supp. VIII, 1960). The test of competence to stand
trial is the same in all other federal courts. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1958).
12. Winn v. United States, 270 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
13. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d) (Supp. VIII, 1960). See note 188 infra and accom-
panying text.
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released from hospital confinement, he must demonstrate that he has recovered
his sanity and that he will not be dangerous to himself or others.1 4 Although
this release formula is phrased differently from the Durham rule, the two tests
are, again, intimately intertwined in practice. To cite but one example, strict en-
forcement of the standard governing release has affected the willingness of
some defendants to invoke the Durham defense.
In short, the Durham rule has made a sharp impact on pretrial competency
and posttrial release proceedings. Administration of the Durham test itself has,
in turn, been deeply influenced by questions that arise in connection with
fitness to stand trial and discharge.
This article discusses some of the issues that have arisen in the District of
Columbia in the post-Durham years in connection with judicial administration
of the three different tests governing competence to stand trial, responsibility,
and release,15 and the interrelationship of these standards. 6 These problems are
not unique to the District of Columbia. Any jurisdiction which recognizes
insanity as a defense must resolve such questions as competence to stand
trial, the proper scope of psychiatric testimony, and the disposition that should
be made of a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity. The experience in the
District of Columbia is particularly illuminating, however, since in the past
seven years many of the issues associated with the problems of mental dis-
order in criminal cases have received careful consideration in the light of
a new and far-reaching test of criminal responsibility.
PRETRIAL ISSUES: COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL
The universally accepted rule prohibiting the trial of a mentally incompetent
defendant' rests, in part, upon humane considerations; in part, upon the
view that the judicial process would be denigrated by the spectacle of a pros-
ecution of a severely disoriented person; and, perhaps most basically, upon
the realization that the reliability of a conviction is reduced if individuals in-
capable of self-defense are forced to stand trial.
In the District of Columbia, the governing statute 18 provides that a motion
for a psychiatric examination to determine competence to stand trial must
14. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(e) (Supp. VIII, 1960) ; see Overholser v. Leach, 257
F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959).
15. See Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 729-30 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 961 (1958) (Prettyman and Burger, JJ.) ; Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667,
670 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959).
16. Issues relating to insanity in civil proceedings in the District of Columbia are
beyond the scope of this article. See Dooling v. Overholser, 243 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ;
Katims, Procedures for Adjudication in Non-Criminal Mental Health Cases in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, 25 J.D.C. BAP Ass'N 294 (1958).
17. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). It has been
held that the trial of an incompetent person would violate due process. Overholser v. Lynch,
No. 15,859, D.C. Cir., January 26, 1961.
18. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(a) (Supp. VIII, 1960).
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be supported by "prima facie evidence . . . that the accused is of unsound
mind or is [so] mentally incompetent ... as to be unable to understand the
proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own defense."' 9 If the
motion is granted, or if the court so orders on its own initiative,20 the de-
fendant may be committed to a mental hospital for a "reasonable period" for
"examination and observation and for care or treatment." If the hospital au-
thorities report to the court that "the accused is of unsound mind or mentally
incompetent," the court may, without more, order the defendant committed to
a mental institution. In the event of objection, however, the court is required to
conduct a hearing and to make "a judicial determination of the competency of
the accused to stand trial." A defendant found incompetent is committed to a
mental institution until the hospital superintendent certifies to the court that the
accused has been "restored to mental competency." 21 On the basis of such cer-
tification, the court may enter an order that the defendant is fit to stand trial,
but if the prosecution or the defense objects, the court must conduct a hearing
to determine if the defendant is competent to stand trial.22 A defendant who
is adjudged mentally competent is brought to trial.
A number of thorny questions have emerged in connection with the fore-
going procedures. Should a psychiatric examination to determine competence
to stand trial also embrace an inquiry into the accused's mental condition as
of the time of the offense? Is it sufficient for psychiatrists to report their find-
ings in the conclusory language of the statute, or should detailed underlying
findings be submitted by them to the court? And what should be done in the
event that an accused person refuses to be interviewed by psychiatrists?
The Motion for a Pretrial Mental Examination
The District of Columbia is unique in requiring that a motion for a psychia-
tric examination must be supported by "prima facie" evidence that the de-
fendant is of unsound mind.2 3 When the Durham case was decided in 1954,
competence to stand trial in the District 24 was determined on the same basis
as in federal courts elsewhere. 25 Under that procedure, "reasonable cause
to believe" that an accused is unfit to stand trial justifies a motion for a psy-
chiatric examination.2 In order to make psychiatric examinations more readily
available, the D.C. Court of Appeals had construed this provision before Durham
19. Ibid.
20. Cf. Carter v. United States, 283 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
21. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(b) (Supp. VIII, 1960).
22. Ibid.
23. Compare the Briggs Act in Massachusetts which provides for an automatic mental
examination for certain classes of accused persons. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 100A
(1955) ; see Kreutzer, Re-examination of the Briggs Law, 39 B.U.L. REV. 188 (1959).
24. See Wear v. United States, 218 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
25. See REPORT OF COMMITTE TO STUDY TREATMENT ACCORDED By FEDERAL COURTS
TO INSANE PERSONS CHARGED WITH CRIME (1944).
26. 63 Stat. 686 (1949), 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1958).
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to require a mental examination unless the motion was made in bad faith and
the supporting grounds were frivolous.27
This ruling was attacked in the District after the Durham case was decided
on the ground that it would encourage attempts to avoid punishment.28 It
was argued that an accused person could engineer his being sent to a mental
hospital for a pretrial examination by filing a petition which was not patently
frivolous, and that at the trial he could then use the period of hospitalization
as evidence to persuade a jury that he suffered from a mental disease or defect
at the time of the offense. 29 This argument prevailed with Congress. In 1955
it provided that in the District of Columbia courts alone a more exacting
"prima facie" showing, rather than simply "reasonable cause," would be a
jurisdictional prerequisite to a pretrial psychiatric examination. 3
The "prima facie" evidence requirement is quixotic in a number of respects.
In effect, the statute demands a showing at the outset of the very data which
the motion is designed to elicit by psychiatric examination. Moreover, the
statute was drafted with the objective of making it more difficult to obtain a
psychiatric examination, 1 although the trend, as evidenced by Congressional
enactment in 1949 of the "reasonable cause" provision, has been in just the
opposite direction. Finally, there is little merit to the argument that a malingerer
can mislead a jury by pointing to a history of hospital confinement in connection
with a competency inquiry. tinder District law, as under federal statute, evi-
dence that the defendant is competent to stand trial is normally inadmissible
on the theory that an insanity defense might otherwise be seriously prejudiced
because the jury could be misled into concluding that the accused was of sound
mind on the date of the offense.32 But if a defendant himself introduces evidence
that he was once adjudged incompetent to stand trial and that he was confined
in a mental institution in that connection, he waives his right to exclude evidence
that he has recovered his sanity and has been adjudged competent to be tried.33
In other words, a defendant who seeks to take advantage of a commitment
order made to ascertain his competence opens the gate to otherwise inad-
missible evidence which may totally undermine his insanity defense.
27. Wear v. United States, 218 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
28. COMMITTEE ON MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE, REPORT TO THE
COUNCIL ON LAw ENFORCEMENT OF THE DISTRICr OF COLUMBIA, in S. REP. No. 1170, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 11 (1955).
29. Ibd.
30. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (a) (Supp. VIII, 1960). By its terms, this statute super-
sedes in the District the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1958) which governs pre-trial
competency motions in all other federal courts. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(h).
3f. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON MENTAL DISORER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE, op.
cit. supra note 28.
32. 63 Stat. 686 (1949), 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1958) ; see Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d
725, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958) (Prettyman and Burger, JJ.);
Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
33. Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 730-32 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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On the whole, the statutory requirement that the accused produce "prima
facie" evidence of incompetence as a prerequisite to a mental examination has
been construed liberally. In March 1960, for example, roughly twenty per
cent of all persons indicted in the District were undergoing pretrial mental
examinations.34 Such examinations are usually authorized on the basis of
affidavits of defense counsel, typically court appointed, who affirm that the
defendent's behavior during consultations and his personal history indicate
the need for a psychiatric examination. 35 A previous record of hospitalization
in a mental institution, discharge from the armed forces on psychiatric grounds,
or the nature of the offense itself may be sufficient to warrant the examina-
tion.
The prosecution itself has increasingly taken the initiative in requesting
the court to order pretrial mental examinations, particularly in capital cases.36
The government's primary objective, however, is not to establish the accused's
fitness to stand trial, but rather to gather evidence respecting the defendant's
mental condition as of the date of the crime in order to rebut any claim of
insanity at the time of the offense should such a defense be subsequently raised.
A defendant is not required in the District to give notice to the prosecution in
advance of trial that he will invoke the insanity defense.3 7 If a defendant con-
ceals an intention to rely on an insanity plea for a long period after his in-
dictment, the prosecution may find it difficult, or even impossible, to discharge
its burden of proving that the defendant was of sound mind on the date of the
offense. For that reason, the government seeks a mental examination shortly
after the defendant's arrest on the theory that a reliable diagnosis of his mental
condition is more likely-and is, therefore, of greater evidentiary value-than
a psychiatric report based on a mental examination administered long after
the crime.38
A pretrial mental examination in these circumstances may raise substantial
constitutional questions. The presumption of innocence may well preclude a
mental examination before indictment at the insistence of the prosecution,
and effective protection of the privilege against self-incrimination may also
require that no accused person be examined who is not represented by counsel.
34. The Washington Evening Star, March 4, 1960, p. B2, col. 1.
35. See Winn v. United States, 270 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1959)-; Calloway v. United
States, 270 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
36. See, e.g., Winn v. United States, 270 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
37. See Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, Proceedings, May 26,
1960, at 66; Gasch, supra note 10, at 6-7. Several states have enacted statutes which require
the defendant to give notice of his intention to rely on the defense that he is not respon-
sible. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.03, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). In the District of
Columbia, the prosecution is typically alerted to the possibility that an insanity defense
may be interposed by a defense motion for a mental examination to determine competence
to stand trial.
38. "Presumably the less time that elapses between the act and the psychiatric ex-
amination, the more accurate will be the medical opinion." Blunt v. United States, 244 F.2d
355, 364 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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Further, the rights of the accused would seem to require that he be advised
that he need not communicate with the government's psychiatrists, at least
so long as he does not interpose an insanity plea.39 In any event, a psychiatric
examination will be ordered more readily if the accused consents, and trial
courts in the District tend to insist upon a stronger showing of necessity for
the examination where the prosecution is the moving party.
The Relationship Between Courts and Psychiatric Experts in
Pre-Trial Proceedings
Some of the most troublesome problems with respect to pretrial mental
examinations relate to scope-(i) the scope of the mental examination which
the courts direct psychiatrists to make as well as the breadth of the ex-
amination actually carried out, and (ii) the scope of the psychiatric report
transmitted to the court.40 These problems are discussed below.
The Scope of the Pretrial Mental Examination
The controlling D.C. statute merely authorizes psychiatric tests, at the pre-
trial stage, to determine competence to stand trial.41 However, in order to
obtain a psychiatric opinion with respect to the accused's mental condition at
the time of the offense, a practice arose of requesting comprehensive mental
examinations. Consistent with this practice, the prosecution in Winn v.
United States 42 filed a pretrial motion for a "complete and thorough mental
examination" of a defendant who had hurled a three-day old child from a
third story window. The trial court authorized a psychiatric examination
limited to determining whether the defendant was capable of understanding
the proceedings against him or assisting in his defense. In reversing the judg-
ment, the Court of Appeals held that while the statute requires only an
examination limited to competence to stand trial, it does not prohibit a more
comprehensive examination. 43 The court concluded that thorough psychiatric
tests should be ordered "where it is obvious that the trial will revolve about
the issue of the accused's mental state at the time of the crime . . . . -44 Thus,
the appellate court held in substance that a trial court has inherent power
39. See text at notes 68-79 infra.
40. Some of the problems associated with a pretrial psychiatric examination considered
in this section are discussed perceptively in an unpublished paper by J. William Doolittle,
Jr., Scope of Pretrial Mental Examination of Accused Persons, prepared for a study group
of the 1960 District of Columbia Judicial Conference.
41. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 24-301(a) (Supp. VIII, 1960).
42. 270 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
43. The Court assumed that a psychiatric examination to determine competence to
stand trial is less intensive and thorough than a psychiatric examination designed to as-
certain the accused's mental condition as of the date of the offense. Id. at 328.
44. 270 F.2d at 328. A defendant who does not object to an order restricting the
psychiatric examination to his competence to stand trial cannot challenge the scope of the
examination on appeal. Willis v. United States, 285 F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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to authorize a psychiatric examination, before trial, into the accused's mental
state as of the date of the offense-the critical issue under the Durham test
and other standards of responsibility. Hence, it is no longer necessary to re-
quest an examination respecting fitness to stand trial if the moving party's
sole object is to obtain a professional opinion as to whether the accused was
mentally diseased on the date of the crime.
The examining psychiatrists have been authorized to make whatever tests
they deem necessary in order to advise the court of the defendant's mental
condition.45 Brief jailhouse interviews may be adequate in the case of a severely
disordered defendant who suffers from hallucinations and delusions. All of
the medically recognized techniques for arriving at a diagnosis-physiological
and neurological tests, electroencephalograph, and psychological tests-may
be used when appropriate. Relatives of the accused, his employer, co-workers,
and others may be interviewed by the psychiatrist, if necessary, to obtain
background information essential to an informed opinion.46
The Psychiatric Report
Orders authorizing pretrial mental examinations direct the psychiatrists to
report their opinion to the court. The statute contemplates that the district
court will review the psychiatric report and that the court will independently
determine whether the accused is competent to stand trial. Fitness to stand
trial is not purely a psychiatric question but involves a "judgment based upon
knowledge of criminal proceedings that is peculiarly within the competence
of the trial judge." 47
In many instances, the reports merely inform the court of the psychiatrists'
ultimate conclusion. In a recent case,48 for example, the hospital's report to
the court of a pretrial psychiatric examination read, in its entirety, as follows:
Jacob Calloway [the accused] was admitted to District of Columbia
General Hospital July 18, 1958.
Psychiatric examination reveals this patient to be sane, competent and
capable of participating in his own defense.
He may be returned to the Court at any time.49
45. See Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (dictum).
46. Ibid.; Calloway v. United States, 270 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
47. Gunther v. United States, 215 F.2d 493, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
48. Calloway v. United States, 270 F.2d 334, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
49. Ibid. See also the hospital report to the court in Jones v. United States, 284 F.2d
245, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1960):
Mr. Jones' case has been studied intensively since the date of his admission to Saint
Elizabeths Hospital and he has been examined by several qualified psychiatrists
attached to the medical staff of Saint Elizabeths Hospital as to his mental condition.
On April 6, 1959, Mr. Jones was examined and the case reviewed in detail at a
medical staff conference. We conclude, as the result of our examinations and obser-
vation, that Arthur Jones is mentally competent to understand the proceedings
against him and to properly assist in his own defense,
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On the basis of this report, Calloway was found competent by the District
Court to be tried, and he was subsequently found guilty of assault with a
dangerous weapon.
Reports as cursory as this one-particularly those containing the opinion
that the defendant is incompetent-obviously do not constitute an adequate
basis upon which a court can determine competence. A court cannot possibly
make a "judgment" in a meaningful way if the psychiatric report contains only
a naked conclusion without an underlying explanation. An opinion by an
administrative agency which was drafted in such summary or conclusory form
would be rejected out of hand."
There is an even more basic vice in such conclusory reports--there is no
basis for knowing the standard applied by the psychiatrist or the factors taken
into account by him in reaching his conclusion that the defendant is or is
not fit to stand trial. Competence to stand trial is not a psychiatric syndrome;
it is a legal concept. The symptoms displayed by the patient must be related
to the legal standard. For example, the psychiatrist may have followed the
view that if the accused presently suffers from psychotic symptoms he is
incompetent to stand trial. But there is no necessary correlation between
psychosis and the relevant legal standard--capacity to understand the judicial
proceedings and to assist in one's defense. A psychotic defendant conceiv-
ably could meet this standard ;51 on the other hand, a nonpsychotic defendant
might well be incapable of assisting in his own defense by reason of his mental
condition. A defendant could be so disoriented that he would not understand
that he was in a courtroom on trial. But the mental disorder, even though
severe, may be more subtle in its impact. The accused may suffer from a
delusion that his counsel is an adversary to be resisted. He may suffer from
a desire to inflict punishment upon himself, which could lead him to confess
to acts which he had not committed. His mental condition may be such that he
could not possibly take the witness stand in his own defense; on the other
hand, his illness may impel him to insist upon taking the witness stand in
defiance of his counsel's advice. It is true that counsel and the court can
ascertain which, if any, of these symptoms the accused suffers from by calling
the psychiatrist as a witness at a competency hearing. But there are many
advantages in an informative report. In addition to compelling the examining
psychiatrist to articulate his rationale, with the consequent likelihood of a
more careful examination, a detailed report informs counsel in advance of the
specific issues that will arise if the psychiatric opinion is challenged. Given a
50. The Administrative Procedure Act requires that an agency adjudication "include
a statement of (1) findings and conclusions, as well as the reasons or basis therefor, upon
all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record." 60 Stat. 242
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1007 (1958).
51. "[S]omeone who is certifiably insane may often nevertheless be fit to plead to the
indictment and follow the proceedings at the trial... ." ROYAL ComiussIoN ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 1949-1953, REPORT, CMD. No. 8932, at 78. See also MODEL PENAL CODE §
4.04, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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carefully prepared report, the prosecution may decide to acquiesce to a finding
of incompetence, or the defense may determine to abandon any reliance on
an insanity plea. Moreover, a comprehensive report may obviate the necessity
for a hearing on the competency issue.
The psychiatric report should be specifically related to the legal test. In
order to assist courts in arriving at an informed conclusion, a pretrial psy-
chiatric report should contain minimally (a) a description of the nature of
the psychiatric examination, e.g., the number and duration of psychiatric in-
terviews or the type of psychological or neurological tests administered; (b)
a statement of the clinical diagnosis; (c) a brief description of the symptoms;
and (d) a statement of the specific, underlying reasons or findings to support
the conclusion that the accused is or is not competent to be tried . 2
Many of the foregoing problems also arise in connection with the related
issue of determining whether a defendant, who has been adjudged incom-
petent and subsequently hospitalized, has recovered sufficiently to stand
trial. The hospital authorities are required to advise the court when, in their
opinion, the defendant "is restored to mental competency."53 The psychiatric
standards actually applied by the hospital authorities in reaching this con-
clusion, and the standards which should be applied by the district court in
reviewing their opinion, have never been spelled out. In practice a large meas-
ure of discretion is vested in the hospital authorities in deciding when a de-
fendant, who has been adjudged incompetent, will be brought to trial.
A defendant who takes the initiative and seeks to have himself declared fit to
stand trial operates under severe handicaps. His application is frequently op-
posed by the hospital psychiatrists on the grounds that he is not well enough
to stand trial. Since the accused is usually indigent, he is generally unable to
secure an outside psychiatric consultant in his behalf.54 Thus, the hearing on
an application by a defendant to be adjudged competent to stand trial may
be reduced to the testimony of a hospital staff psychiatrist, on the one hand,
and that of the defendant himself, on the other. This situation is deplorable
for at least two reasons. First, it is desirable that persons who are indicted
should be brought to trial and afforded an opportunity to clear themselves.
Second, many persons who are confined as incompetent harbor a deep sense
of grievance that they are being detained though never found guilty of any
wrongdoing. 5 In short, there are strong policy reasons for giving parties who
wish to establish their competence the fullest possible assistance.
52. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 405 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
53. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(b) (Supp. VIII, 1960).
54. The D.C. Court of Appeals ruled recently that a person found not guilty by reason
of insanity and seeking release from hospital confinement could demand the expert testi-
mony of psychiatrists attached to the District's Commission on Mental Health. Curry v.
Overholser, No. 15,848, D.C. Cir., Nov. 23, 1960, at 6-7. In principle, the same assistance
should be available to persons adjudicated incompetent who are seeking to establish their
fitness to stand trial.
55. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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Problems Arising from Delays in Competency Proceedings
A number of questions have arisen in the District as a result of delays
connected with pretrial competency proceedings. The delay may be due simply
to the time required to complete psychiatric tests. In the typical case when a
motion for a mental examination is granted, a defendant is hospitalized about
90 days before a psychiatric report is submitted to the court.56 A shortage
of psychiatric personnel and inadequate hospital facilities account for most of
this delay.5 7 Delay of an altogether different character will ensue if the de-
fendant is adjudged unfit to stand trial. He will then be ordered hospitalized
until he is found competent to be tried. It is not uncommon for a defendant,
who has been found incompetent, to be hospitalized for two or three years
before being bought to trial.
A defendant's right under the sixth amendment to a speedy trial may be
seriously compromised by these delays. Witnesses may disappear; memories
will fade. It is clear, of course, that delay in the trial date solely because of
the defendant's mental condition will not, without more, justify dismissing the
indictment.58 But if the period of hospital confinement is of long duration,
the prosecution may be compelled to prove that no prejudice resulted to the
defendant from any delay, apart from that attributable to the inevitable post-
ponement necessitated by treatment.5 9
The delays and long periods of confinement associated with competency
proceedings may inhibit motions by the defense for a pretrial mental com-
petency examination in some cases. If the felony with which the defendant is
charged bears only a short prison term upon conviction, an accused who pleads
guilty conceivably could be released before he would be brought to trial were
he found incompetent to stand trial.60 In addition, the likelihood that bail will
be denied to a party awaiting a pretrial mental examination may deter defense
counsel from seeking a psychiatric report.
The mental condition of the defendant may be such as to require even that
the trial be permanently deferred. While a defendant found incompetent and
hospitalized must be brought to trial promptly after he is "restored to mental
56. Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, Proceedings, May 26, 1960,
at 61, 63. In March 1960, the D.C. District Court denied an application for release by a
defendant who had been confined 105 days waiting a psychiatric examination. The Wash-
ington Post & Times Herald, March 4, 1960, p. 3, col. 2.
57. "[O]ur problem of delay seems to resolve itself into a problem of personnel....
[T]he delays . . . in part are the result of under-staffed hospital facilities." Proceedings,
supra note 56, at 62-63.
58. See Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
59. Ibid.
60. "For all that appears, appellant and his former counsel concluded that a jail sen-
tence on two of the ten counts would be preferable to a mental examination under the
Miller Act or under Section 24-301 of the District of Columbia Code, with the possibility
thereafter of an extended period of confinement in St. Elizabeths." Carter v. United States,
?83 F.2d 200, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1960),
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competency ," it is possible that the accused may never recover sufficiently
to stand trial. May such an individual be detained indefinitely? This issue
was raised dramatically in the proceedings involving Ezra Pound, the noted
poet, who was indicted in 1945 on charges of treason and then found unfit to
stand trial.01 Pound was held in St. Elizabeths Hospital, a federally operated
mental institution in the District, for fourteen years. The indictment against
him was dismissed, and he was finally released in 1958 after the hospital
superintendent advised the District Court that Pound suffered from a per-
manent and incurable paranoid state, that further treatment was useless, that
there was no likelihood that he would ever be sufficiently competent to stand
trial, and that he would not be dangerous if he were released. 62
The Pound case supports the view that an accused person who in all proba-
bility will never be fit to stand trial, may not be permanently confined pur-
suant to a pretrial order in a criminal case, provided that he will not be
dangerous to himself or others if discharged. The justification for hospitalizing
an incompetent person who has been indicted is that he may respond to treat-
ment sufficiently to stand trial; however, if recovery is improbable, continued
detention is not warranted. Indeed, it can be persuasively argued that due pro-
cess requires that a defendant should be released even though he may be
dangerous if it appears that he will never recover sufficiently to stand trial.' 3
The power to confine an individual for a "reasonable period" to determine
whether he is fit to stand trial may be defended as a necessity if an informed
conclusion is to be reached as to competence; but if a trial can never occur
there is no justification for continued detention. Indefinite confinement of
a person who has never been tried or found guilty of any offense cannot
be supported by a procedural device of such limited scope.
The community is not denied all protection by this conclusion. Coincident
with the defendant's release, civil commitment proceedings may be initiated if
he is mentally ill and dangerous. 64 But a civil commitment proceeding, in the
District of Columbia as elsewhere, is accompanied by numerous procedural
safeguards, including the right to a jury trial. 5
The issue left open by the Pound proceeding is how long a defendant may
be detained before he must be released on the grounds that he will in all
likelihood never be competent to stand trial. In some instances, this conclusion
can be reached by the hospital authorities within a few months; in other cases,
61. United States v. Pound, Crim. No. 76028, D.D.C., Nov. 26, 1945.
62. Affidavit of Dr. Winfred Overholser, April 14, 1958, ibid.
63. In a concurring opinion in Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960),
Judge Fahy maintains that even in the case of an individual tried and acquitted by reason
of insanity, "the validity of continued confinement [in a hospital] . . . may require that,
unless within a reasonable time he progresses toward becoming not dangerous to self or
community, the person committed can be held only by a separate civil adjudication of
unsoundness of mind .... " Id. at 950.
64. See Overholser v. Williams, 252 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
65. See Williams v. Overholser, 259 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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a long period of observation and treatment will be necessary before a reasoned
opinion can be offered as to the prospects for recovery. In any event, the
Pound case exposed a deficiency in the District's statutory procedure. It would
appear desirable to provide that at specified intervals the hospital authorities
must submit a report to the court containing their most recent diagnosis, a
description of the course of the treatment, and their provisional prognosis."
Defendants less well known than Ezra Pound may otherwise languish for
years in a mental institution, although innocent of any wrongdoing.
Questions Arising from the Refusal of an Accused Person to be Interviewed
by the Psychiatric Consultants
Some defendants, who have been ordered hospitalized to determine their
competence to stand trial, have refused, upon advice of counsel, to participate
in a psychiatric interview.67 It has been argued in behalf of such persons that
the privilege against self-incrimination justifies the refusal to communicate
with the psychiatric consultants. 63
It is possible in some cases for a psychiatrist to make a provisional diagnosis
without actually interviewing the patient. lie can do so by observing the
defendant's behavior over a long period, or upon the basis of information
supplied by intimate associates of the patient or by other persons who have
had contact with him. The psychiatric interview is, however, the basic diag-
.nostic tool,69 and a patient's refusal to speak to the psychiatrist may seriously
impede a prompt and reliable diagnosis. 70
66. It has been recommended that the hospital submit a report to the court with re-
spect to the accused's mental condition at least every six months. Proceedings, supra note
56, at 65.
67. See The Washington Post & Times Herald, April 29, 1960, p. Dl, col. 2. See also
Halleck, The Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia-A Legal Lorelei, 49 GEo. L.J.
294, 302-03 (1960).
68. See The Washington Post & Times Herald, July 21, 1960, p. A3, col. 6.
69. See SULLiVAN, THE: PsYcHIATRic INTERVIEW (1954). Sullivan defines a psychi-
atric interview as a "situation of primarily vocal communication in a two-group, more or
less vohntarily integrated, on a progressively unfolding expert-client basis for the purpose
of elucidating characteristic patterns of living of the subject person, the patient or client,
which patterns he experiences as particularly troublesome or especially valuable, and in
the revealing of which he expects to derive benefit." Id. at 4. (Emphasis in original.)
70. A proper examination calls first of all for a physical examination and if possible
an electroencephalogram to determine from what are colloquially known as "brain waves"
whether or not there is a tendency toward epilepsy or some other gross abnormality of the
brain. The presence or absence of gross neurological changes should be tested. A reason-
ably full history of the individual is essential, together with various psychological tests;
the history should be obtained from the subject himself and from outside sources. No one
is an entirely dependable source of information about his own conduct, particularly in
criminal cases, where self-serving and self-exculpatory declarations are likely to be met.
The psychiatric interview should include not only the history but the ascertaining of the
presence or absence of delusions and hallucinations, evaluation of the judgment of the sub-
ject, his recognition of his relations with those about him or What we term orientation, his
[Vol 70: 905
DURHAM RULE
A defendant's unwillingness to participate in a psychiatric interview may in
itself be a symptom of severe mental disorder. But the accused's refusal may
be a voluntary act in accordance with the advice of counsel. 7 1 The legal ram-
ifications of this latter type of refusal varies with the procedural setting. A
defendant who seeks a pretrial psychiatric examination to determine com-
petence cannot, of course, consistently refuse to be examined. It would not,
therefore, appear unjust for a trial court to hold that such a defendant is pre-
sumptively competent to be tried.
The question becomes considerably more complex, however, at the trial stage.
A noncooperative defendant may interpose the substantive defense that he
suffered from a mental disease or defect at the time of the offense. The District
of Columbia follows the federal rule that once sanity is in issue, the prosecution
is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was of sound
mind at the time of the offense.7 2 In these cases the government may be compelled
to produce expert testimony that the accused is of sound mind, particularly if
the defendant offers experts in his behalf. There is, thus, considerable force to
the contention of prosecuting attorneys that it is intolerable to impose the
burden of persuasion upon the government while allowing the accused to
foreclose access to essential data which can be obtained only from the de-
fendant himself and which the prosecution requires in order to discharge its
burden.7 3
This issue has not yet been authoritatively resolved in the District. But
there may be several possible solutions.
First. It has been suggested that the self-incrimination objection is un-
sound. One commentator has observed:
The privilege protects the accused from supplying any testimonial link
in the chain of evidence to establish the conclusion that he committed
the crime in question; it has no application to an inquiry as to his mental
responsibility at the time the act was committed; for even though an
accused's guilt depends upon his mental condition at the time of the com-
mission of the act, a psychiatric examination has no bearing upon the
question of whether he actually committed it.7 4
This view of the scope of the fifth amendment is reflected in the doctor-patient
privilege which has developed in the District of Columbia. A psychiatrist can-
memory, his thought processes and his emotional reactions, such as undue elation or de-
pression or indifference. Overholser, Criminal Responsibility-A Psychiatrist's Viewpoint
unpublished manuscript).
71. See The Washington Post & Times Herald, April 29, 1960, p. DI, col. 2.
72. See note 160 infra and accompanying text.
73. There are, of course, countless instances where a defendant has knowledge of in-
formation helpful to the prosecution which he cannot be required to divulge. The situation
presented here, however, appears to be unique in that (i) the issue involved is raised by
the defendant; (ii) if the issue is raised, the government bears the ultimate burden of
proof; and (iii) information which is essential in discharging the burden can be obtained
in most cases only from the person of the defendant.
74. INBAU, SELF INCRIMINATION 55 (1950).
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not divulge, over the defendant's objection, any information communicated to
him in his professional capacity which could be used as evidence that the accused
commited the act in question. 75 However, the doctor-patient privilege in the
District has been made inapplicable "to evidence relating to the mental com-
petency or sanity of the accused in criminal trials where the accused raises the
defense of insanity. '76 In brief, statements by the accused to a psychiatrist bear-
ing on commission of the offense are privileged, but statements pertinent to the
accused's mental condition are admissible. Thus, for example, a defendant can-
not prevent disclosure by a psychiatrist on the witness stand of an admission
by the accused that he was feigning insanity, but the defendant can block any
disclosure of a confession of guilt made to the psychiatrist.
If the privilege against self incrimination is not a valid basis for refusal by an
accused person to speak to a psychiatrist, there would appear to be no valid
reason why the prosecution could not offer evidence in rebuttal to a claim of
insanity that the defendant had declined to be interviewed.77 The prosecution
could also request an instruction to the effect that although the accused was not
obligated as a matter of law to submit to a psychiatric examination, he had
refused to do so, and his unwillingness could be weighed by the jury in ap-
praising the defendant's claim that he was mentally diseased.
This argument, however, may proceed from a faulty premise. It assumes that
the defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense is not covered by the
privilege. But mens rea is, of course, as essential an element in proving an
offense as evidence bearing upon commission of the act itself. It is difficult to
justify a view of a constitutional privilege which is so technical and restrictive.
Second. A more radical solution would be to exclude evidence of insanity
tendered by an accused who voluntarily refuses to be examined. Even if the
right to plead insanity is constitutionally protected, it does not follow that
reasonable conditions cannot be annexed to exercise of the right. Hence,
willingness to be examined could be made a condition of raising the defense.78
75. Edmonds v. United States, 260 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
76. D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-308 (Supp. VIII, 1960). See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE, op. cit. supra note 27, at 14-16.
77. If refusal to communicate with a psychiatrist is protected by the self incrimination
provisions of the fifth amendment, neither court nor counsel can call the attention of the
jury to the unwillingness of the accused to be examined. See Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 50 (1947).
78. Cf. People v. Esposito, 287 N.Y. 389, 397-98, 39 N.E.2d 925, 928 (1942) (uphold-
ing the admissibility of statements made to psychiatrists by accused persons while under
the influence of drugs) :
It must be remembered that the orders for the [mental] examination and observa-
tion were based upon the defendants' claim that they should escape punishment by
reason of their mental condition at the time of . . . arraignment and trial. Under
those circumstances defendants may not both advance their claims and then seek to
make the rules for the determination of those claims. Since they desired to present
their claims that they were not legally responsible for their acts because of mental
defect they were subject to the use of methods set up objectively by the medical pro-
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However, this approach may be foreclosed by a recent pronouncement of the
Court of Appeals that there is "almost a positive duty on the part of the trial
judge not to impose a criminal sanction on a mentally ill person. '7 9
A limitation on both of these approaches to the problem of the noncoopera-
tive defendant is that they presuppose an accused who is capable of making
a rational choice between submitting to an examination or foregoing the
insanity defense. It may on occasion be difficult to distinguish between a dis-
ordered defendant whose refusal to communicate is a symptom of his illness,
and an accused-who may or may not be mentally ill-who refuses to be in-
terviewed on advice of counsel. Yet some adjustment is needed between the
interests of the noncooperative defendant who pleads insanity and the prose-
cution which is shouldered with the burden of proving the accused sane, but
which is denied access to those techniques generally accepted as prerequisites
to reliable diagnoses.80 Objections by the defense to a psychiatric interview
might diminish if there were a requirement that mental examinations be con-
ducted by an impartial, independent board of medical experts, 8' closely super-
vised by the court. This might provide an attractive alternative to the current
system whereby examinations of this kind are administered by doctor-em-
ployees of the government.
TRIAL PROBLEMS UNDER THE DURHAM RULE
The Post-Durham Status of the M'Naghten, Irresistible Impulse,
and Diminished Responsibility Tests
At the trial, the substantive rule of responsibility determines the character
of the evidence as to mental disorder and the instructions which will be given to
the jury.When Durham was decided, the substantive tests of criminal respon-
sibility in the District were the M'Naghten right and wrong rule 82 and the
irresistible impulse test.8 3
fession for the proper determination of such claims. Courts, under the circumstances
presented here, may not control the methods which have been determined by the
medical profession to be proper means for discovering or treating mental diseases.
79. Overholser v. Lynch, No. 15859, D.C. Cir., Jan. 26, 1961, at 8. See text at notes
174-78 infra.
80. In addition to the solutions discussed in the text, it has also been proposed that
the rules as to the burden of proof should be changed in the case of a noncooperative de-
fendant; the accused would be required to prove that he was of unsound mind. Accord,
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
81. A plan to use impartial medical experts in personal injury actions is now under
consideration in the District of Columbia. Washington Post & Times Herald, Dec. 1, 1959,
p. B13, col. 4.
82. (Emphasis in original.) M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210 (H.L. 1843):
[T]he jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed to be
sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes,
until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defence on
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The Durham decision left the future status of these two pre-existing tests
in doubt.8 4 In 1956, about two years after Durham, the Court of Appeals made
clear that it had not intended "to bar all use of the older tests."85 As the
court subsequently explained: "While capacity to distinguish right from wrong
is no longer the earmark of legal sanity, the lack of that capacity is one of
the earmarks of legal insanity." 81 Accordingly, testimony that the accused can-
not differentiate right from wrong or that he acted because of an uncontroll-
able impulse is presently admissible in the District. 7 And if the testimony
so warrants, the jury must be instructed to consider these symptoms, as well
as all others, in deciding the ultimate issue of responsibility-whether the
criminal act was the product of mental disease or defect.88
Like the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse standards, the Durham rule
does not recognize the gradations between sanity and insanity which are
affirmed by nearly all mental health specialists8 9 An accused is either sane,
and therefore completely responsible, or he is of unsound mind, and thus
the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing
of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing;
or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.
The first reported case in the District in which the right and wrong test was applied was
the trial of Charles Guiteau, President Garfield's assassin, in 1881. Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed.
161 (D.D.C. 1882); Guiteau's Case, 12 D.C. (1 Mackey) 498 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 1882). For
a recent review of the Guiteau case which indicates that there are substantial grounds for
believing that Guiteau suffered from paranoia, see Donovan, Annals of Crime: The In-
pression, The New Yorker, April 24, 1954, p. 91.
83. A defendant is immune from punishment under this test if it is proved that he was
"impelled to do the act by an irresistible impulse," that is, if "his reasoning powers were
so far dethroned by his diseased mental condition as to deprive him of the will power to
resist the insane impulse to perpetrate the deed, though knowing it to be wrong." Smith
v. United States, 36 F.2d 548, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
84. The Durham decision, by its terms, applied only prospectively so that verdicts
rendered before July 1, 1954, under the pre-existing tests were not disturbed on appeal.
Stogner v. United States, 229 F.2d 513 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Jordan v. United States, 217
F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
Some trial judges in the District were of the view that Durham had abolished the
M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests, see Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4, 12 (D.C.
Cir. 1957), while other trial judges allowed counsel to examine witnesses in terms of the
older tests and charged juries in terms of both the Durham rule and the pre-existing tests.
85. Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 52, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
86. Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1957). (Emphasis in original.)
87. Stewart v. United States, 247 F.2d 42, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
88. Misenheimer v. United States, 271 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
89. [T] o the psychiatrist mental cases are a series of imperceptible gradations from
the mild psychopath to the extreme psychotic, whereas criminal law allows for no
gradations.
Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945). See OVERHOLSER, THE
PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 44-46 (1953); GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFFEN, PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAw 428-33 (1952).
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totally exempt from punishment. In a pre-Durham case decided in 1945,
Fisher v. United States,90 the Court of Appeals was urged to recognize that
there are persons who are not insane but whose mental powers are so deficient
that it would be unjust to hold them fully responsible. Fisher was charged
with first degree murder. The District of Columbia statute defining this offense
is unique in that it expressly requires that the homicide be committed by a
person of "sound memory and discretion." 91 There was evidence that Fisher
was a person of low grade mentality, and psychiatric testimony was presented
to the effect that Fisher was a "psychopathic personality of the predomin-
antly aggressive type."'9 2 The defense maintained that Fisher's mental con-
dition was such that he lacked the "sound . . . discretion" required for a
conviction of first degree murder, and argued that the jury should be permitted
to find Fisher guilty of a lesser offense, specifically second degree murder.
In substance, the defense urged adoption of a test of diminished responsibility
in capital cases.
The trial court refused to grant the requested instruction. Fisher was found
guilty and sentenced to death. In sustaining the trial court, the Court of
Appeals acknowledged that, "Modern psychiatry has given us much scientific
information which disturbs the former certainty of our judgments of individual
responsibility and moral guilt. 9 3 The court was unwilling, however, to sanc-
tion the diminished responsibility notion: "In the determination of guilt, age
old conceptions of individual moral responsibility cannot be abandoned without
creating a laxity of enforcement that undermines the whole administration of
criminal law."94 The Supreme Court refused to disturb the judgment on the
grounds that acceptance of the partial responsibility doctrine "would involve
a fundamental change in the common law theory of responsibility," a change
which the court felt should properly be made by Congress or by the District
of Columbia courts.95
In 1954, while the Durham case was sub judice, the D.C. Court of Appeals
was urged in a capital case involving a borderline mental defective to recon-
sider its ruling in Fisher and to approve the partial responsibility test.9 6 The
court declined to do so, saying that it wished an adequate opportunity to ap-
raise the operation of the then newly adopted Durham test.9 7 In 1960, after
90. 149 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1945), aff'd, 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
91. D.C. Cona AxN. § 22-2401 (1951).
92. 149 F.2d at 29. There was no testimony that Fisher was not aware of the differ-
ence between right and wrong, the then applicable test of responsibility, and on appeal it
was conceded that he was "sane in the usual legal sense." 328 U.S. at 466.
93. 149 F.2d at 29.
94. Ibid.
95. 328 U.S. at 476. Justices Frankfurter, Murphy, and Rutledge dissented.
96. Brief for Abram Chayes as Amicus Curiae, Stewart v. United States, 214 F.2d
879 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
97. 214 F2d at 883. The conviction was reversed, however, because of a misleading
instruction by the trial judge to the effect that psychopaths were criminally responsible.
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six years of experience under Durham, the court flatly rejected the diminished
responsibility doctrine.98 The court concluded that:
The problem of classifying, assessing and analyzing the results of the
application of modem psychiatry to administration of the criminal law as
it relates to gradations of punishment according to the relative intelligence
of the defendant is beyond the competence of the judiciary .... The basic
framework for sentences of punishment must be established by the legis-
lative branch.... That must be done by long range studies by competent
public and quasi-public entities and by legislative committees with trained
staffs aided by objective technical and scientific witnesses who can deal
with all aspects of the problem .... 19
The court's rationale is curiously inconsistent with its willingness to exer-
cise its rule-making power as evidenced by its adoption of the Durham rule it-
self. Its rejection of the diminished responsibility doctrine may be explicable
on different grounds which were not articulated. The Durham and diminished
responsibility tests each have a common ethical core: It is wrong and futile to
punish the blameless-those who are not and will not be influenced by punitive
sanctions.100 But the insanity test evolved in the District has another justifi-
cation-that in certain cases hospitalization and treatment may afford greater
protection to the community in the long run.101 The diminished responsibility
test does not further this latter objective, since the plea is invoked only to
mitigate punishment. The defendant, if found guilty, is imprisoned or fined,
but he is not hospitalized and treated.
The diminished responsibility rule can serve an important office in jurisdic-
tions which still adhere closely to the M'Naghten rule and which permit capi-
tal punishment; it is a useful doctrinal device for avoiding the death penalty
where there is evidence of substantial impairment of mental capacity. In the
District of Columbia, on the other hand, the Durham test is sufficiently broad
to take account of such cases, and bills have been introduced in Congress to
abolish the mandatory death sentence in capital cases in the District.10 2 These
circumstances have dulled the drive for adoption there of the diminished re-
sponsibility doctrine.
98. Stewart v. United States, 275 F2d 617, 623-24 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 363
U.S. 818 (1960).
99. 275 F.2d at 624.
100. "Our collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose
blame." Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
101. Two policies underly the distinction in treatment between the responsible and the
nonresponsible: (1) It is both wrong and foolish to punish where there is no blame
and where punishment cannot correct. (2) The community's security may be better
protected by hospitalization under D.C. Code, § 24-301 than by imprisonment.
Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1957). See also Douglas v. United
States, 239 F.2d 52, 60 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
102. S. 2083, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); see Blocker v. United States, 274 F.2d
572, 574 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (dissenting opinion).
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The Status Under the Durham Ride of Psychopaths, Intellectually Deficient
Individuals, and Persons Suffering from Psychoneurotic Disorders
The Durham test was deliberately designed to encompass every type of men-
tal illness.'0 3 Controversy has still arisen with respect to the status under the
Durham rule of (i) psychopaths, (ii) individuals who have a defect of intel-
ligence such that they would be classified as mentally deficient in varying de-
grees, and (iii) persons who suffer from mental disorders which are not clini-
cally diagnosed as psychotic or as psychopathic, but which are usually deemed
to be psychoneurotic disorders.
(i) Psychopaths (or "sociopaths with an anti-social reaction," the nomen-
clature preferred by the American Psychiatric Association) have been defined
as
chronically antisocial individuals who are always in trouble, profiting
neither from experience nor punishment, and maintaining no real loyal-
ties to any person, group or code. They are frequently callous and hedon-
istic, showing marked immaturity with lack of sense of responsibility,
lack of judgment, and an ability to rationalize their behavior so that it
appears warranted, reasonable and justified.'0
In most jurisdictions, psychopaths are held criminally responsible. 05 This
principle is justified in part on the theory that psychopaths do not differ qualita-
tively from normal persons.' 1 6 Moreover, many psychiatrists believe that psy-
chopaths are not amenable to treatment, or that only certain types of psycho-
paths can be aided by intensive therapy, so that commitment to already over-
crowded mental institutions would be pointless. While some psychiatrists re-
gard psychopaths as mentally diseased, others disagree with this classifica-
tion. 0 7 On the other hand, there is widespread consensus among psychia-
103. See Briscoe v. United States, 248 F.2 640, 641 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (Bazelon, J.).
104. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL-
MENTAL DISORDERS 38 (1952). The Mental Health Act, adopted in England in 1959, de-
fines psychopathy as "a persistent disorder or disability of mind .. . which results in abnor-
mally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the patient and requires
or is susceptible to treatment." 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 72.
The term "psychopathic personality" has "been used for many years as a convenient
psychiatric waste-basket for cases otherwise difficult to classify." REPORT, N.J. CoMM'N
ON HABITUAL SEx OFFENDER 39 (1950). See also Kozol, The Psychopath Before the Law,
260 NE W ENG. 3. OF MED. 637 (1959) ; Inglis, The Psychopath, Encounter, Sept. 1960, p. 3.
105. See WVEIHOFEN, fENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 26, 123 (1954).
106. See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION, op. cit. supra note 51, at 139:
For the present we must accept the view that there is no qualitative distinction, but
only a quantitative one, between the normal average individual and the psychopath,
and the law must therefore continue to regard the psychopath as criminally respon-
sible.
In England, as a result of the Homicide Act of 1957, a psychopath may in certain
circumstances invoke the diminished responsibility test in defense to a charge of murder.
Rex v. Byrne, [1960] 2 Q.B. 396.
107. [S]ome psychiatrists will consider psychopathy a mental disorder, and many
among the more analytically oriented even a mental disease, while others, chiefly
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trists that psychopaths are significantly less capable of self-control than nor-
mal persons ;108 they may be "subject to aggressive or perverted urges as
much beyond their control as a tidal wave."'' 0
In form, the law in the District applicable to psychopaths differs from the
generally accepted view that evidence of psychopathy will not justify an ac-
quittal on grounds of insanity. Under the Durham test, it is for the jury to de-
cide whether an individual with the personality traits of a psychopath suffers
from a mental disease such that he should not be held criminally responsible.110
Evidence that the defendant has been diagnosed as a psychopath justifies sub-
mission of the insanity defense to the jury, and it has been held to be reversible
error for a trial judge to charge a jury that a psychopath "is not within the
definition of insanity as defined by law."'
In practice, however, psychopaths are almost invariably held accountable in
the District. Psychopaths are commonly counseled not even to raise the in-
sanity defense because of the D.C. statute requiring automatic, compulsory
hospitalization of all persons found not guilty by reason of insanity and de-
cisions strictly construing the release provisions of this act."12 The Court of
Appeals has ruled in substance that a defendant acquitted on insanity grounds
may be detained until the hospital superintendent and the district court are
satisfied that he does not suffer from an "abnormal mental condition" which
makes him dangerous. 113 Since psychopaths are deemed to be "mentally ab-
normal" even by many psychiatrists who do not classify them as mentally
"diseased," and since psychopaths frequently have long records of delinquency,
there is substantial liklihood that they will be hospitalized for an indefinite
period if found not guilty because of insanity. In brief, although the Durham
rule extends to psychopaths, few psychopaths actually invoke the defense, and
the practical situation in the District with respect to psychopaths remains sub-
stantially as it was prior to July 1, 1954. There is one significant qualification:
those of the old school, will slough these off as merely instances of a "behavior
disorder."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, app. C (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
Those psychiatrists who would regard such persons as the victims of disease proceed
upon the theory that capacity for law-abiding living in society if a constituent of
mental health, with the conclusion that its absence is disease; or else on the hypo-
thesis that psychical disorder underlies all maladjustments of this kind although the
present state of knowledge may not serve to explicate the nature of the psychical
disorder except in terms of its results.
New York Governor's Conference on the Defense of Insanity, Interim Report of the Study
Committee, N.Y. May 29, 1958, p. 4 (mimeographed draft)..
108. See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COmImssiOx, op. cit. supra note 51, at 137.
109. Cross, The Plea of Diminished Responsibility, The Listener, Jan. 5, 1961, p. 10.
110. Stewart v. United States, 214 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ; Taylor v. United States,
222 F.2d 398, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
111. Ibid.
112. See text at notes 197-204 infra.
113. See Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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Under Durham, the way is open for seriously disordered psychopaths to plead
insanity, so that it is at least possible in the District of Columbia for a psycho-
path to be held exempt from criminal responsibility.
(ii) An intelligence defect may range from mild (an impairment connected
with an I.Q. rating of 70 to 85), to modest (a functional impairment requiring
special vocational training and associated with an I.Q. rating of about 50-70)
to severe (an I.Q. below 50, requiring custodial care).114 It has been argued
that individuals who suffer from moderate to severe defects are incapable of
criminal intent," 5 and that such persons should consequently be held exempt
from criminal responsibility. There is no doubt, for example, that "in the
feebleminded, judgment, moral sense, and appreciation of right and wrong are
defective, and the power of self-control is substantially less than that of a nor-
mal person." 6
Evidence of low scores on intelligence tests was at first proferred in the
District in support of the diminished responsibility doctrine.1 1 7 After the Court
of Appeals refused to sanction that test, such evidence was tendered as proof
of the fact that the defendant suffered from a mental "defect" within the
meaning of the Durham rule. In other words, it was urged that evidence of an
extremely low I.Q. score could justify total exemption from criminal responsi-
bility." 8 The Court of Appeals has held, however, that such evidence is not
sufficient to warrant a Durham instruction to the jury." 9 The court was
heavily influenced by the view that there is no "absolute accuracy and reliabili-
ty" for intelligence tests, and that the results in such tests can vary materially
depending upon the education and background of the person being tested. 120
The court thus regards I.Q. tests, which have the facade of arithmetical cer-
tainty, as less reliable in helping to determine responsibility, than a psychiatric
diagnosis.
(iii) The Durham rule was invoked by a pyromaniac who set fires to gratify
sexual urges, 121 and it would be applicable to the compulsive thief. The Dur-
ham rule has rarely been asserted, however, by persons suffering from psycho-
114. AmucAN PSvcrriATIC ASSocIATIoN, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL-
MENTAL DISORDERS 23-24 (1952).
Persons with an I.Q. rating of 0-25 are classified as idiots, 25 to 50 as imbeciles, 50 to
70 as morons, and 70 to 90 as borderline. NoyEs & KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
330 (5th ed. 1958).
115. See Stewart v. United States, 275 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 363
U.S. 818 (1960).
116. See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION, op. cit. supra note 51, at 121.
117. See Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 467 (1946) ; Stewart v. United States,
214 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
118. See Moore v. United States, 277 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
119. Ibid.
120. See Stevart v. United States, 275 F.2d 617, 624 n.10 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted,
363 U.S. 818 (1960).
121. See Briscoe v. United States, 248 F.2d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Briscoe v. United
States, 251 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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neurotic disorders, although evidence of such a condition might be sufficient
in an appropriate case to warrant submitting to the jury the question of the
defendant's responsibility. The rarity of the Durham plea by persons with psy-
choneurotic disorders may be attributable, in part, to the widely held belief
that only psychotic disorders constitute a basis for exemption from criminal
responsibility.122 And since many psychiatrists do not classify persons with
neurotic disorders as mentally "diseased," defense counsel may encounter diffi-
culty in securing medical evidence to support an insanity defense in such cases.
In sum, the Durham test has been invoked primarily by psychotics, oc-
casionally in behalf of psychopaths, and rarely in the case of persons suffering
from other types of mental disorders.
The Psychiatric Expert Under the Durham Test
The Durham rule is designed to overcome barriers to communication be-
tween psychiatric experts and the courts erected under the M'Naghten and
irresistible impulse tests.123 The test is designed to afford the jury a maximum
opportunity to hear evidence which may shed light on the defendant's conduct.
It is designed to encourage a psychiatrist-a trained investigator in motiva-
tion and behavior-to communicate to the jury, in his own terms, his expert
opinion respecting the defendant's mental condition at the time of the of-
fense. 24 In brief, a chief objective of Durham and related decisions has been
improvement in the "quality and candor" of psychiatric testimony. 125
In delineating the proper function of expert testimony in a criminal case
involving insanity, the Court of Appeals has emphasized that "Unexplained
medical labels-schizophrenia, paranoia, psychosis, neurosis, psychopathy-
are not enough.... The chief value of an expert's testimony in this field, as
in all other fields, rests upon the material from which his opinion is fashioned
and the reasoning by which he progresses from his material to his conclusion;
in the explanation of the disease and its dynamics, that is, how it occurred, de-
veloped, and affected the mental and emotional processes of the defendant; it
does not lie in his mere expression of conclusion." 126
A definitive judgment concerning the extent to which the Durham formula
has in fact improved the quality of psychiatric testimony would entail, among
other things, a comparative analysis of trial transcripts under the Durham
122. 248 F.2d at 641 n.2.
123. For a dramatic illustration, see People v. Horton, 308 N.Y. 1, 20-22, 123 N.E.2d
609, 618-20 (1954) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
124. "The purpose of employing an expert [psychiatric] witness is to obtain for the
jury the benefit of his educated conclusions. He must give the jury the type of clinical
opinion he is accustomed to form and to rely upon in the practice of his profession." Blunt
v. United States, 244 F.2d 355, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
125. Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. CRl. L. Px.Ev. 367, 376
(1955).
126. Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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rule with transcripts of cases tried in other jurisdictions under different tests
of responsibility.127 Such studies, which are now in process, are beyond the
scope of this paper.' 28 But a number of specific issues have arisen with respect
to expert testimony which invite comment. For example, what is the probative
significance under the Durham rule of testimony by a psychiatrist in response
to such questions as, "Was this criminal act a product of mental disease or de-
fect ?" or, "Do the defendant's symptoms constitute a mental disease or a men-
tal defect ?"
The "Product" Question
Psychiatric experts who testify at the trial are commonly pressed by counsel
to state, in the language of Durham, whether the alleged criminal act was the
"product" of mental disease.129 This inquiry presents a conceptual difficulty
for those psychiatrists who do not believe it is meaningful to separate a per-
son's behavior from his psyche and to assert that some behavior is "caused"
127. A prominent psychiatrist who "stud[ied] the trial records as well as the appel-
late opinions" in some post-Durham decisions in the District, concluded as follows:
The most striking feature of the post-Durham insanity cases is the failure by nearly
all psychiatric experts to utilize the new rule for its intended purpose .... The testi-
mony of most of the psychiatric experts continued to list classical symptoms of
psychiatric syndromes, without discussing them from the standpoint of how they
motivated or were related to the alleged criminal act. The records are replete with
such words as "insanity," "psychosis," "schizophrenia," and "irresistible impulse,"
the peculiar cliched idiom of this kind of case for more than 100 years. We find
prosecution, and defense counsel frequently utilizing psychiatric language they ob-
viously do not comprehend. Likewise, psychiatrists glibly use expressions like "in-
competent," "unsound mind," and "insane"; legal words with no psychiatric or
medical meaning. In short, discussions between psychiatrists and lawyers remained
at the pre-Durham level, where stereotyped language, long since isolated from the
roots of its legal or medical meaningfulness, continued as the principal vehicle for
communication. Little if anything comprehensible or useful was conveyed to jury or
judge in this manner, and their fact-finding about sanity, surely was due to impulse
and chance, as often as it was to reason.
Watson, Durham Phs Five Years: Development of the Law of Criminal Responsibility
in the District of Columbia, 116 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 289-90 (1959).
128. Cf. James, Jurors' Assessment of Crninal Responsibility, 7 SocIAL PROBLEMS
58 (1959). In connection with the University of Chicago jury project, Miss James analyzed
the deliberations of panels of jurors who heard a recorded transcript of a trial presenting
the insanity defense. Some panels were instructed in terms of the M'Naghten rule, others
in terms of the Durham test. Some panels heard psychiatric testimony cast in technical,
conclusory terms; other panels heard "model" psychiatric testimony. The deliberations were
recorded with the knowledge of each panel. Findings published to date suggest that the
nature of the offense itself (e.g., did the crime appear to be planned, was it a crime of vio-
lence) bulks larger in the jurors' deliberations than the expert testimony or the particular
rule of responsibility.
129. See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Hopkins v.
United States, 275 F.2d 155, 157 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; Martin v. United States, 248 F.2d
217 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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by a mental illness while other behavior is not.18 0 Some psychiatrists, on the
other hand, accept a view of causation articulated in the Royal Commission
Report on Capital Punishment and endorsed by the Court of Appeals:
Mental abnormalities vary infinitely in their nature and intensity and in
their effects on the character and conduct of those who suffer from them.
Where a person suffering from a mental abnormality commits a crime,
there must always be some likelihood that the abnormality has played some
part in the causation of the crime; and, generally speaking, the graver the
abnormality, the more probable it must be that there is a causal connection
between them. But the closeness of this connection will be shown by the
facts brought in evidence in individual cases and cannot be decided on the
basis of any general medical principle. 81
In other words, the question of causal connection requires a judgment on
the specific facts in each case. It may be a question of considerable complexity,
since an answer requires a diagnosis of the accused's mental condition as of a
date previous to the psychiatric examination, and a judgment as to what effect
the disorder had on the accused's conduct at that time. If the illness is cycli-
cal in character and marked by great fluctuations in intensity,13 2 and if a
substantial interval has elapsed since the crime, a definitive answer may be
impossible. One judge has caustically described this process as "antegno-
sis." 133 However, the necessity for ascertaining the defendant's mental condi-
tion at a point in the past-on the date of the offense-is not unique to Dur-
ham.134 It is also a feature of the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests.
These two tests do not require an explicit judgment as to causation, but a
judgment as to that issue is at least implicit in the uncontrollable impulse
formula.
A leading critic of the Durham test, Professor Herbert Wechsler of Colum-
bia University, Chief Reporter for the Model Penal Code, has argued that
Durham is fatally defective as an administrable standard because of the logi-
cal ambiguity of the "product" concept.' 3 5 He argues in substance that if the
Durham rule means that a defendant is exempt if he would not have com-
130. Cf. Szasz, Psychiatry, Ethics, and the Crininal Law, 58 COLUJm. L. REv. 183
(1958).
131. REPORT OF THE ROYAL CoamussioN, op. cit. supra note 51, at 99. The excerpt in
the text has been twice quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals. Durham v. United
States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ; Blocker v. United States, 274 F.2d 572,
573 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
132. A manic depressive disorder, for example, is "marked by severe mood swings,
and a tendency to remission and recurrance." AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASsN, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL, MENTAL DISORDERS 25 (1952).
133. Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (Miller, J., dissenting).
134. Cf. Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some Observations on
the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 Y.LE L.J. 225, 229
n.17 (1960).
135. Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 367
(1955); Address, "Law, Morals and Psychiatry: Old Problems and Recent Reassess-
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mitted the act "but for" the illness, it would embrace too many persons; it
could be construed to cover every case where mental disease is present. On the
other hand, Wechsler maintains, if the Durham formula means that the crime
must be the product of the illness in the sense of complete exclusion of volition
by the defendant, then Durham represents no advance over the right and
wrong rule.
The Court of Appeals, responding in effect to this line of criticism, has
explained that there must be proof that the illness "critically" or "decisively"
affected the defendant's behavior:
When we say the defense of insanity requires that the act be a 'product
of' a disease, we mean that the facts on the record are such that the trier
of the facts is enabled to draw a reasonable inference that the accused
would not have committed the act he did commit if he had not been dis-
eased as he was. There must be a relationship between the disease and
the act, and that relationship, whatever it may be in degree, must be, as
we have already said, critical in its effect in respect to the act. By 'criti-
cal' we mean decisive, determinative, causal; we mean to convey the idea
inherent in the phrases 'because of', 'except for', 'without which', 'but for',
'effect of', 'result of', 'causative factor'; the disease made the effective or
decisive difference between doing and not doing the act. The short phrases
'product of' and 'causal connection' are not intended to be precise, as
though they were chemical formulae. They mean that the facts concerning
the act are such as to justify reasonably the conclusion that 'But for this
disease the act would not have been committed.' 13
Not surprisingly, the testimony with respect to causation has covered a broad
spectrum in some cases. In Martin v. United States,137 for example, six psy-
chiatrists and a psychologist testified as to the accused's mental condition. One
psychiatrist stated that if the accused were psychotic at the time of the offense,
the crime would "of necessity" be a product of the illness. Another testified
that a causal connection between the illness and the crime was "possible,"
still another felt the connection "probable," and a fourth was willing to say
that there was a "strong probability" of a connection. An expert called by the
government, who diagnosed the defendant as a sociopathic personality, ex-
pressed the opinion that there was "probably no connection." Each of these
opinions was carefully qualified. 13 In these circumstances, it was held that
the product question was properly an issue to be resolved by the jury.
Prosecuting attorneys on occasion have complained that where there is sub-
stantial proof of mental illness they have encountered difficulty in obtaining
experts who are willing to testify, on rebuttal, that the crime was not the
ments," Annual Meeting of the New York Society for Clinical Psychiatry, Jan. 15, 1959.
See also MODEL PENAL CoDE § 4.01, comments at 159 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) ; N.Y.
Gov. Conference on Insanity, Interim Report of the Study Committee, May 29, 1958
(mimeographed text).
136. Carter v. United States, 252 F2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
137. Martin v. United States, 284 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
138. Id. at 5.
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product of the sickness. 18 9 But Durham allows the prosecution alternative
routes. It can prevail by proving either that the defendant was not mentally
diseased, or that the criminal act was not the product of the disease. And in the
great majority of cases, the issue is basically whether the accused suffered
from a mental disease.
Part of the confusion over the "product" issue stems from the misconcep-
tion that it is essentially a psychiatric question to be resolved by mental health
experts. It is not. Whether the criminal act is so critically related to the mental
illness as to exempt the defendant from responsibility is a jury question to be
decided on the basis of the entire record, of which the psychiatric testimony
is only a part. "The ultimate inferences vel non of relationship of cause and
effect, are for the trier of the facts."' 40
Is the Illness a Disease?
The psychiatric experts are also commonly asked, in the language of the
test put to the jury, whether the symptoms described by them constitute a
"mental disease" or a "mental defect." This form of question has led to con-
siderable controversy.
There is a fundamental difference between asking a psychiatrist whether
the accused is mentally diseased, and asking the jury to decide the same ques-
tion. The psychiatrist is asked to express an opinion as to a question bearing
upon medical classification and terminology. Psychiatrists who may agree as
to symptoms and even as to the diagnosis, may disagree as to whether a par-
ticular disorder should be classified as a disease. The jury, on the other hand.
is called upon to decide the ultimate issue of responsibility. Its province is to
determine whether the defendant is so mentally diseased that he should be
exempt from punishment.' 41
Failure to heed these distinctions led to an extraordinary episode in the Dis-
trict involving a change in psychiatric classification. Shortly after the Durhaz
case was decided, the St. Elizabeths Hospital authorities concluded that socio-
paths should not be classified as mentally diseased. 42 Subsequent to this de-
cision the institution's staff psychiatrists, who appear in most of the criminal
cases in the District where sanity is an issue, usually testified to that effect
when called as witnesses. In November 1957, after extensive consideration, the
hospital staff changed its view: "[P]eople suffering from sociopathic person-
ality disturbance should be 'labelled' as diseased, as mentally ill . . . "143 This
switch led the Court of Appeals to set aside a conviction for first degree
139. See Gasch, Prosecution Problems Under the Durham Rile, 5 CATHOLIC LAW. 5,
21, 26 (1959); Report of Committee on Criminal Responsibility, 26 J.D.C. BAR Ass'N
301, 309-10 (1959).
140. Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
141. Briscoe v. United States, 248 F.2d 640, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (Bazelon, J.).
142. Id. at 644 n.6.
143. Blocker v. United States, 274 F.2d 572, 573 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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murder involving a sociopath who had been tried before November 1957.144
The St. Elizabeths' psychiatrists had testified at the trial, in accordance with
the opinion then prevailing, that although the accused was a sociopath he was
not mentally diseased. While an appeal was pending, the hospital staff changed
its view as to the classification of sociopathic personality disturbances. In order-
ing a new trial, the Court of Appeals observed that the defendant. "his life at
stake, was entitled to a verdict based upon the most mature expert opinion
available on an issue vital to his defense." 145
This change in psychiatric opinion, and the ensuing reversal of the con-
viction, provoked sharp criticism of the Durham formula. 1 46 It was argued
that determination of responsibility had been abdicated by the courts to medi-
cal specialists whose views are in constant flux. -
There are some who believe that the vice of testimony by psychiatrists in the
ultimate language of the test can be eradicated only by abolishing the Durham
rule.147 But the problem can be resolved by less drastic measures: either by
forbidding psychiatrists to testify in terms of the test itself, or by appropriate
instructions to the jury. The objection to restricting psychiatrists in this manner
is that the Durham rule is designed precisely to eliminate artificial testimonial
restrictions, and the limitation might well handicap an expert in communicating
his opinion.
If psychiatrists are allowed to testify whether symptoms constitute a "dis-
ease," the jury must be carefully instructed that in applying the Durham test
it may accept or reject expert testimony-that it is not deciding whether the
defendant should be considered "diseased" for medical purposes. The court
should make plain that the jury renders what Durham itself characterized as
a "moral judgment," or, in any event, a judgment of a highly complex nature
in which the medical testimony is only one of many operative factors. As one
District Judge has aptly put it:
[W]hether a given defendant's condition amounts to a 'mental disease'
is a question of fact which is determined by a trier [of fact] after asking
some questions which are particularly medical in orientation, and other
questions which may not be necessary to a strictly medical diagnosis.148
The Presumption of Sanity and Burden of Proof Under the Durham Rule
Neither the Durham opinion nor subsequent decisions by the D.C. Court
of Appeals have altered the familiar rules, applied in all federal courts, that
an accused person is presumed to be sane, that the duty of producing evidence
144. Ibid.
145. Ibid.
146. Report of Committee on Criminal Responsibility, 26 J.D.C. BAR Ass'N€ 301, 306-
07 (1959).
147. Blocker v. United States, No. 15777, D.C. Cir., March 3, 1961 (Burger, J., con-
curring).
148. United States v. Amburgey, D.D.C., Criminal Action No. 144-60, Nov. 30, 1960
(Youngdahl, J.).
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of insanity rests in the first instance upon the defendant, and that once sanity
is in issue the prosecution has the ultimate burden of proving beyond a reason-
able doubt that the accused is sane.149 New content has been given to these
rules, however, by the Court of Appeals. The thrust of the court's decisions
is that the prosecution bears an especially heavy responsibility for producing
expert evidence on the insanity issue.'50 The opinions addressed to these
problems reflect recognition that most criminal defendants are paupers or
penniless vagrants, uneducated, and represented by court appointed counsel
who serve without a fee, and that the government has at its disposal extensive
psychiatric facilities and investigative resources.
The Presumption of Sanity
An accused who claims that he was not responsible has the initial duty of
introducing "some evidence" showing that he suffered from a mental disease
or defect at the time of the offense."5' The defendant is not required to show
that the crime was the product of mental illness in order to place insanity in
issue.152 Thus, one who offers "some evidence" of unsound mind in effect
obtains the benefit of a presumption of fact that there is a causal connection
between his illness and his allegedly criminal behavior.'53 However, if the
prosecution presents testimony to the effect that the crime was not the product
of the illness, the defendant may be obliged on rebuttal to present contradictory
evidence in order to prevail with the jury.
It is obviously impossible "to formulate a quantitative measure of the
amount of evidence necessary" to satisfy the "some evidence" requirement.'5
The quantum will vary from case to case. In general, however, trial courts
have been liberal in permitting the insanity issue to go to the jury. The Dur-
ham test has been submitted to the jury where there is "a bare minimum of
evidence of insanity." 15 For example, a jury was permitted to consider the
defendant's responsibility where the only evidence of insanity consisted of a
declaration by the defendant on the witness stand that "I did this crime un-
149. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895) ; Rivers v. United States, 270
F.2d 435, 439 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 920 (1960) ; Carter v. United States,
252 F.2d 608, 614-15 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 52, 55 (D.C.
Cir. 1956).
150. See Blunt v. United States, 244 F.2d 355, 364 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
151. [I]n criminal cases the defendant is entitled to have presented instructions relat-
ing to a theory of defense for which there is any foundation in the evidence, even
though the evidence may be weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility.
Tatum v. United States, 190 F.2d 612, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1951). See also Durham v. United
States, 214 F.2d at 875; Logan v. United States, 284 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
152. See United States v. Amburgey, D.D.C., Crim. Action No. 145-60, Nov. 30, 1960.
153. See excerpt from REPORT OF THE ROYAL CoMaSSION, op. Cit. supra note 51
(quoted in text at note 131 mtpra).
154. Tatum v. United States, 190 F2d 612, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1951).




beknowing to what I was doing.. . I believe I was insane, out of my head"
on the night of the shooting.'5" And the Court of Appeals set aside one con-
viction because of a failure to charge the jury on insanity where the defendant,
an alcoholic charged with taking indecent liberties with a child, testified that
he had delusions and heard voices.1 7 In the usual case in which an accused
claims that he was of unsound mind at the time of the offense, the evidence
adduced by the defendant in discharging his duty of going forward consists
of testimony by psychiatric experts, testimony by laymen who know the ac-
cused intimately and have observed abnormal conduct, 158 and evidence of pre-
vious confinement in mental hospitals. Thus, a trial court was held not to have
erred in refusing to give an insanity instruction where there was no evidence
by experts of mental abnormality, no testimony by any lay witness of irrational
conduct by the defendant, and the only evidence pertinent to the issue
was testimony of the defendant himself that he remembered nothing of the
crime.159
The Burden of Proof
Once insanity has been put in issue by some evidence of mental disease or
defect, the prosecution can prevail only if it establishes beyond a reasonable
doubt either that the defendant had no mental disease or defect, or that the
crime was not the product of mental illness.'1 0 Thus, if the government cannot
prove that the defendant was of sound mind, it can prevail by showing the
absence of a causal relationship between the illness and the act.
A striking indication of the extent to which the government is held to its
burden is shown by the fact that on five separate occasions since Durhdm, the
Court of Appeals has taken the unusual step of reversing a conviction on the
grounds that the trial court should have set aside a jury verdict and directed
a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity because the prosecution failed to
prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.16 ' In each case, the expert psychi-
atric testimony offered by the defense was substantial and persuasive. The
156. Clark v. United States, 259 F.2d 184, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (dissenting opinion).
This liberal interpretation of the "some evidence" requirement was made in a capital case.
Compare Smith v. United States, 272 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
157. Goforth v. United States, 269 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
158. Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; see Kelley v. (Jnited
States, 236 F.2d 746, 747-48 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
159. Wright v. United States, 215 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See also Smith v. United
States, 270 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Lebron v. United States, 229 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir.
1955).
160. Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; Wright v. United
States, 250 F.2d 4, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 52, 55 (D.C.
Cir. 1956).
161. Isaac v. United States, 284 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Satterwhite v. United
States, 267 F2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; Fielding v. United States, 251 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir.
1957) ; Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Douglas v. United States,
239 F.2d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See also Hopkins v. United States, 275 F.2d 155 (D.C. Cir.
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prosecution, on the other hand, relied either exclusively on the testimony of
laymen who did not know the defendant intimately-the victim of a robbery,
witnesses to the crime, the policeman who made the arrest-or upon experts
who did not contradict testimony by defense experts that the defendant suffered
from a mental disease or defect. The practical import of these decisions is that
the prosecution must assume the responsibility of producing either laymen
who have been closely associated with the defendant for a long period of time,
or experts who are prepared to affirm that the defendant was not suffering
from a mental disease or defect at the time of the offense.
The Court of Appeals has recognized a distinction between testimony as to
the defendant's mental condition by laymen who have had only brief contact
with the accused (e.g., the arresting officer) and laymen who have been asso-
ciated with the defendant on intimate terms for a prolonged period (e.g., a
spouse or relatives). Testimony by a casual acquaintance to the effect that the
defendant appeared to be of sound mind is obviously of slight value, though
testimony by such a witness that he observed abnormal behavior would be of
considerable probative importance."' 2 On the other hand, testimony by a close
associate of the defendant of many years standing obviously is entitled to sub-
stantial weight, whether it is to the effect that the accused behaved normally or
otherwise.
The importance of these distinctions is reflected in the rules which have
emerged with respect to the burden of proof.
1. If qualified psychiatrists disagree with respect to the defendant's sanity
at the time of the offense, the issue should be resolved by the jury, and its
verdict will not be disturbed.6 8
2. If the expert psychiatric testimony offered on behalf of the accused is
equivocal or ambiguous, and contradictory testimony by laymen-particularly
those who have been long and intimately associated with the defendant-is
substantial and credible, the issue should be left to the jury. 6 4
3. If the expert testimony on behalf of the accused is extensive and impres-
sive, the government does not discharge its burden of proof by the testimony
of arresting officers or laymen who have had only brief contact with the ac-
cused; in the absence of contradictory testimony by qualified experts or long
1959)' (verdict by court sitting without jury reversed because government failed to satisfy
burden of proof on sanity issue).
162. Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; Hopkins v. United
States, 275 F.2d 155, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
163. Starr v. United States, 264 F.2d 377, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
936 (1959) ; Jordan v. United States, 217 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ; cf. Jones v. United
States, 284 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See also Dukes v. United States, 278 F.2d 262 (D.C.
Cir. 1960) (case was properly submitted to jury when government psychiatrist said there
was no causal connection while defendant's expert said he was unable to offer an opinion
on this point).
164. Bradley v. United States, 249 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Kelley v. United States,
236 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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time intimates of the defendant, the trial court should direct a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity.165
Instructions to the Jury
Juries are typically charged in the exact language of the Durham opinion
itself, as supplemented by the gloss placed upon the "product" portion of the
rule in Carter v. United States.1"" In addition, the jury must be told in sub-
stance that if the defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity, he will be hos-
pitalized until the hospital authorities and the courts are satisfied that he has
recovered his sanity and that he will not be dangerous to himself or others if
released. 16 7 This instruction may have an enormous influence on the jury's
deliberations, and it is clearly one of the most important developments in this
field since Durham itself.
The disposition of the defendant following the verdict is theoretically of no
concern to the jury; its function is to determine guilt or innocence. A jury,
however, commonly knows the consequences of a guilty or not guilty verdict.
Jurymen are typically aware that unless probation is granted a defendant who
is found guilty may be executed, imprisoned, or fined.' 68 The consequences of a
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, however, are not commonly under-
stood. The jury does not usually know that a defendant who is acquitted on
insanity grounds will be confined in a mental institution. In the absence of this
knowledge, "a jury, influenced by the specter of violent lunatics turned loose
in the community, may 'convict despite strong evidence of insanity at the
time of the crime.' "160
These considerations prompted the Court of Appeals to hold shortly after
Durham that in a trial involving an insanity defense "counsel may and the
judge should inform the jury that if [the defendant] is acquitted by reason of
insanity he will be presumed to be insane and may be confined in a 'hospital
for the insane' as long as 'the public safety and ... [his] welfare' requires." 170
Failure to give this instruction was not, however, held to be reversible error,
and some district judges adhered to the view that the instruction was not ob-
ligatory in all cases, particularly if the defendant did not request it.17i
165. See cases cited note 161 supra.
166. 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; see text at note 136 supra.
167. Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 728-29 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 961 (1958).
168. "The jury was fully aware of the fact that in the District of Columbia the punish-
ment of murder in the first degree is death by electrocution. .. ." Blocker v. United States,
274 F.2d 572, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (dissenting opinion).
169. Tatum v. United States, 249 F.2d 129, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 943 (1948) (dissenting opinion) ; see Howard v. United States, 229 F.2d 602, 608
(5th Cir. 1956) (dissenting opinion), rev'd on rehearing en banc, 232 F.2d 274 (1956).
170. Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
171. See Tatum v. United States, 249 F.2d 129, 132-33 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 943 (1958).
19,61]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
In 1955, Congress enacted legislation requiring compulsory hospitalization
in all cases where a defendant is acquitted on insanity grounds. 7 2 The statute
itself does not require that the jury be apprised of the defendant's fate in the
event of an insanity verdict. But subsequent to passage of this legislation, the
Court of Appeals concluded that in all cases where the insanity issue is sub-
mitted to the jury, trial courts must inform juries of the disposition which will
be made of the defendant. 173 Failure to so instruct a jury would today con-
stitute grounds for reversal in the District.
The Entry of a Verdict of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity Over the
Defendant's Objection
Assuming that a defendant is found competent to stand trial, may a trial
judge disregard a plea of guilty and substitute a verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity over a defendant's objection? This question has arisen in the Dis-
trict of Columbia in proceedings involving persons who are charged with petty
offenses, such as disorderly conduct or passing bad checks, which bear a short
prison term upon conviction. 174 As discussed below, a verdict of not guilty
because of insanity results in commitment until the defendant establishes that
he is free from an "abnormal mental condition" which renders him dangerous,
that is, in confinement for an indefinite period. For this reason, some defend-
ants have sought to plead guilty and have strenuously resisted a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity.
The trial judge may be alerted to the possibility that the defendant was of
unsound mind at the time of the offense by the psychiatric report transmitted
to the court in connection with proceedings to determine fitness to stand trial.
That report may contain a psychiatric opinion to the effect that the crime was
the product of mental disease. In a recent case 175 the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that in these circumstances a trial judge has discretion to reject a guilty
plea and, if the evidence so warrants, to find the defendant not guilty by reason
of insanity, not withstanding the defendant's objection.
The argument in favor of the exercise of this power runs along the follow-
ing lines. First, it is not obligatory upon a trial court to accept a guilty plea;
there are appropriate circumstances when such a plea may be disregarded.17
Indeed, a trial judge cannot conscientiously overlook evidence of insanity.
There is "almost a positive duty on the part of the trial judge not to impose
172. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d) (Supp. VIII, 1960).
173. - Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 9c1
(1958).
174. See Overholser v. Lynch, No. 15,859, D.C.' Cir., Jan. 26, 1961; Williams v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 147 A.2d 773 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1958); Williams v. Overholser, 259
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See also The Washington Post & Times Herald, Jan. 30, 1961,
p. B1, col. 2.
175. Overholser v. Lynch, supra note 174.
176. See, e.g., United States v. Trinder, 1 F. Supp. 659 (D. Mont. 1932).
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a criminal sentence on a mentally ill person." 177 Second, the public, as well as
the accused, has a legitimate interest in the principle that a person who is
mentally diseased at the time of the offense should not be held criminally re-
sponsible. A defendant of unsound mind should not receive a short sentence of
imprisonment which leaves him free in a brief time to commit further criminal
acts; the public safety, as well as the welfare of the accused, requires that he
be hospitalized until reasonable assurance can be given that he will not be
dangerous. "Society has a stake in seeing to it that a defendant who needs
hospital care does not go to prison." 17
8
Forceful arguments can be marshaled, however, against compelling a defend-
ant to stand trial on the insanity issue. If an individual is competent to stand
trial, by definition he is competent to submit any permissible plea. Although it
is true that a "court may refuse to accept the plea of guilty," 179 such pleas are
almost invariably received in noncapital cases if the accused is represented by
counsel and if it is clear that the plea has been "made voluntarily after proper
advice and with full understanding of the consequences." 180 Moreover, in the
typical case where a guilty plea is rejected, a defendant is discharged if found
not guilty. However, if a defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity, he is hos-
pitalized until he is sane and no longer dangerous. The consequences of refusal
to accept a guilty plea are, therefore, radically different if a trial on an insanity
issue ensues.
The accused's privilege to enter a guilty plea is intimately associated with his
constitutional right to counsel. The defendant may have been counseled to enter
a guilty plea in the expectation that a less severe sentence will be imposed, or in
order to avoid a public trial. On the other hand, a defendant may have been ad-
vised to plead guilty because of counsel's belief that the rigorous standards for
release from hospital confinement can never be satisfied by the accused.' 8' A
trial court's refusal to accept a guilty plea may, thus, seriously compromise the
right to effective assistance by counsel.
An extraordinary inversion of the usual roles of the prosecution and the de-
fense results if the trial court rejects a guilty plea and then receives evidence
bearing on the accused's mental condition as of the date of the offense. The de-
fense insists in such circumstances that the accused was sane at the time of the
offense, and that he is guilty; the prosecution,' in a reversal of its customary
position, undertakes to show that the accused was of unsound mind, that the
crime was the product of a mental disease, and that the defendant is not guilty
by reason of insanity. The rules as to burden of proof in this situation have not
been delineated. Presumably, the usual rules respecting the burden of proof are
applicable; that is, the defendant will be adjudged not guilty by reason of 'in-
177. Overholser v. Lynch, No. 15,859, D.C. Cir., Jan. 26, 1961, at 8.
178. Id. at 9.
179. FED. R. Cvim. P. 11.
180. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927) ; High v. United States,
No. 15996, D.C. Cir., March 2, 1961.
181. See text at notes 215-17 infra.
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sanity if there is a reasonable doubt that he was mentally diseased at the time
of the crime. Hence, the accused cannot prevail unless he proves that he was
sane.
The rules relating to burden of proof, however, are designed to reflect the
greater resources and superior investigative facilities available to the prosecu-
tion. A defendant, who is commonly indigent, ordinarily lacks the resources
to disprove what is in effect a charge of mental disease. For example, he may
not possess sufficient funds to retain a nongovernment psychiatrist as an expert
witness. In brief, forcing a defendant to stand trial on an insanity issue shoulders
him with an evidentiary burden which he is seldom equipped to meet.
These objections as to the evidentiary burden would be partially mitigated
if a rule were adopted-applicable only to the situation where a guilty plea is
rejected-that a defendant is sane if there is reasonable doubt as to his sanity.
If insanity were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the guilty plea could
be reinstated, or the defendant could be allowed to plead not guilty.
Finally, the community's interest in the hospitalization of mentally ill of-
fenders is not completely sacrificed if the accused's guilty plea is accepted and
he is sentenced to imprisonment. If the defendant, though competent to stand
trial, requires treatment for his mental condition, he can be transferred by the
prison authorities to a mental institution for as long as the duration of his
sentence.'8 2 It is, however, true that the period required for treatment is not
necessarily commensurate with the sentence. But if the individual is mentally
ill and dangerous at the expiration of his sentence, civil commitment proceedings
can be initiated. 83
One aspect of this controversy touches upon the obligations of counsel to-
ward a person accused of a criminal offense. Counsel, frequently court ap-
pointed, may know that the accused suffered from a mental disease; but the
defendant may insist that a plea of guilty be entered, and that no disclosure be
made of his mental condition. If, as the Court of Appeals has stated, there is
"almost a positive duty" by a trial judge not to punish a mentally ill person,
can counsel-who is an officer of the court-withhold information which could
frustrate the performance by the court of its judicial duty? Can an attorney,
who recommends a plea of insanity but is overruled by his client, withdraw his
appearance without disclosing to the court the very facts which his client wishes
suppressed? And should an attorney who conscientiously believes that the wel-
fare of his client would best be served by a plea of guilty apprise the court of
the accused's mental condition? These questions are currently unresolved in
the District of Columbia.
POSTTRIAL COMMITMENT AND RELEASE
In its Durham opinion, the Court of Appeals defined a "mental disease" as
a condition which is "considered capable of either improving or deteriorat-
182. 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (1958); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-302 (Supp. VIII, 1960); see
Carter v. United States, 283 F.2d 200, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
183. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-311 (1951).
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ing."'1 84 The change in mental condition which can occur over a period of time
is the empirical fact at the root of one of the most perplexing problems in the
administration of the insanity defense: If a person who is acquitted on insanity
grounds is hospitalized, under what circumstances should he be released?
The mental condition of an accused person may alter significantly in the
time interval between the date of the offense and the jury's verdict. Thus, the
defendant may have suffered from a severe mental disorder at the time of the
crime-for example, an illness which would be clinically diagnosed as a psy-
chosis. As a result of therapy, or because of other factors, he may subsequently
experience sufficient remission or diminution in the symptoms of the illness,
so that he becomes lucid. Indeed, the accused must be in sufficient contact with
reality to be competent to stand trial. Yet during the trial the defendant may
still be suffering from a severe mental illness which requires treatment and
which would render him dangerous if released. On the other hand, it is by no
means inconceivable that by the time of the verdict, a defendant who is found
not guilty by reason of insanity as of the date of the offense, may have re-
covered sufficiently so that he would no longer be diagnosed as psychotic. If
the defendant's mental condition at that point is such that he could not be in-
voluntarily committed to a mental institution in a civil proceeding, under what
theory can he be confined in such an institution if he is acquitted because he
was mentally diseased when the crime was committed? Moreover, even if the
defendant is of unsound mind at the time of the verdict, he may subsequently
recover sufficiently so that he could be released without danger to the public
or to himself. What should be the standard of release, and who should deter-
mine whether the defendant will be released? 185
When Durham was decided in 1954, it was discretionary with the trial
courts in the District of Columbia whether a defendant acquitted by reason of
insanity would be committed to a mental institution. 8 6 Trial judges were
empowered-but not required-to order hospitalization in such cases. While
it was customary for persons found not guilty because of insanity to be com-
mitted as a matter of routine,18 7 it was at least theoretically possible for a de-
fendant to be released scot free following such a verdict.
Apprehension that Durham would result in a flood of acquittals by reason
of insanity and fear that these defendants would be immediately set loose led
to agitation for remedial legislation. In 1955, Congress enacted a statute mak-
184. 214 F.2d at 875.
185. This question is thoughtfully discussed by Goldstein & Katz, supranote 134.
186. The District of Columbia Code in 1954 provided in pertinent part as follows:
"[I]f an accused person shall be acquitted by the jury solely on the ground of insanity,
the court may certify the fact to the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, who may order such person to be confined in the hospital for insane." D.C.
CODE ANN. § 24-301 (1951). (Emphasis supplied.) See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d
862, 876 n.57 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
187. See Com rF~m ON MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE, REPORT TO THE
COUNcIL ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, in S. REP. No. 1170, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5, at 12-13 (1955).
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ing hospitalization automatic and mandatory in every case tried in the District
of Columbia where a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity.' 8s
The primary legislative purpose was protection of the public safety. The
statute is designed "to guard against imminent recurrence of some criminal
act" by a person acquitted on insanity grounds who presumably is not signifi-
cantly influenced in his conduct by punitive sanctions.1 8 9 But the statute also
indirectly reinforces the vitality and integrity of the insanity defense. It dis-
courages frivolous insanity pleas and, when brought to the attention of the
jury, eliminates a factor which could seriously prejudice a meritorious in-
sanity plea.
In addition to requiring compulsory hospitalization, the statute prescribes
the conditions and procedure for release from hospital confinement. The issues
discussed below have arisen in this connection.
The Statutory Scheme
The jury's verdict that the defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity is,
of course, not a finding that the accused is insane at the time of the verdict.
Indeed, it does not necessarily constitute a finding that the defendant was of
unsound mind when the offense was committed; it may signify only that there
was a reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds whether the accused was then
mentally ill, a doubt which the prosecution failed to dispel.190 The statute con-
templates, however, that every person acquitted on grounds of insanity shall
automatically be committed to a mental institution.19' The act does not require
a separate posttrial hearing or any finding with respect to the mental condition
of the defendant as of the date of the verdict.192
188. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d) (Supp. VIII, 1960). There is no provision similar
to the District of Columbia statute governing the conduct of trials in other federal courts;
defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity are customarily set free. See Sauer v.
United States, 241 F.2d 640, 651 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1957). See
also Guttmacher, Principal Difficulties with the Present Criteria of Responsibility and
Possible Alternatives, MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, app. B, at 171 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
In some cases, a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity in a federal court could
be committed to a state mental institution in a civil commitment proceedings in a state
court pursuant to applicable state law.
189. See note 187 supra.
190. See Ragsdale -v. Overholser, 218-F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
191. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d) (Supp. VIII, 1960); REPORT OF THE CoMTuTEE
ON MENTAL DISORDER AS A - CRIMINAL DEFENSE, op. cit. supra note 187, at 12-13.
192. It has been urged that the statute be amended to provide, in cases where a person
is found not guilty by reason of insanity, for a hearing, promptly after the trial, at which
the question would be whether the defendant was presently "dangerously insane." Halleck,
The insanity Defense in-the District of Columbia-A Legal Lorelei, 49 GEO. L.J. 294, 318-
19 (1960). Only "dangerously insane" individuals would be detained. Defendants who were
not insane, i.e., sociopaths, and defendants who were insane but not dangerous, would be
released if this procedure were followed. The constitutionality of the statute providing for
automatic hospitalization without a posttrial hearing was upheld by the D.C. Court of
Appeals in Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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The statute authorizes unconditional and conditional releases from compul-
sory hospitalization. 1 3 For an unconditional release the hospital superintendent
must certify to the District Court that the defendant "(1) . . . has recovered
his sanity, (2) that, in the opinion of the superintendent, such person will not
in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others, and (3) in the
opinion of the superintendent, the person is entitled to his unconditional re-
lease from the hospital .... -1"'4 The court may authorize release on the basis
of this certificate alone or, on its own initiative, the court may require a hear-
ing to determine if the defendant "has recovered his sanity and will not in the
reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others." A hearing must be held
if the United States attorney objects to the release.
Conditional release may be authorized if the superintendent certifies that the
defendant is fit "to be conditionally released under supervision."'195 The court
is vested with ultimate authority to determine whether, and under what con-
ditions, probationary release will be allowed.
It should be noted that while the statute contemplates that release proce-
dures will be initiated by the hospital superintendent, the committed person
himself may apply for release by a petition for habeas corpus.196
Judicial Gloss on the Standard for Release
The statutory release provisions have been strictly construed against parties
seeking their freedom. The statute came before the D.C. Court of Appeals for
the first time in a 1958 case, Overholser v. Leach. 97 Leach was acquitted of
robbery charges on grounds of insanity and was thereupon committed to St.
Elizabeths Hospital. Five months after trial he filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, alleging that he was eligible for release from hospital confine-
ment. In resisting the application, the hospital authorities asserted that they
could not certify that Leach would not be dangerous to himself or others if he
were discharged. At a subsequent hearing, seven psychiatrists testified. All
agreed that Leach was a "sociopathic personality with dysocial outlook" and
that he would be dangerous to the community if released.' 98 Five of the spe-
cialists took the view that Leach should be classified as mentally diseased;
two of the psychiatrists, however, entertained the opinion that the illness was
not a mental disease. The Court of Appeals concluded that in these circum-
stances Leach had failed to establish that the hospital authorities had acted
arbitrarily in refusing to issue the statutory certificate, and accordingly that
he was not entitled to release.
193. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(e) (Supp. VIII, 1960).
194. Ibid.
195. Ibid.
196. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(g) (Supp. VIII, 1960); see Overholser v. Leach, 257
F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959) ; Ragsdale v. Overholser,
281 F.2d 943, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; O'Beirne v. Overholser, No. 15,634, D.C. Cir., Nov.
23, 1960, at 6.
197. 257 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959).
198. Id. at 669.
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In the opinion as first announced the court formulated the standard gov-
erning release in these words:
The [statutory] phrase "establishing his eligibility for release" as applied
to the special class of which Leach is a member, means something differ-
ent from having one or more psychiatrists say simply that the individual
is "sane". There must be freedom from such mental disease or defect as
would make the individual dangerous to himself or the community in the
reasonably foreseeable future.1""
The test governing release as thus phrased-proof by the accused of "free-
dom from such mental disease or defect" as would render him dangerous-
was made equivalent in a critical respect with the Durham test of responsi-
bility. The release statute, however, does not use the phrase "mental disease
or defect"; rather it is cast in terms of recovery of sanity and the dangerous-
ness of the accused if released. The record in the Leach case disclosed the
troublesome questions which would immediately arise if the Durham standard
were assimilated to the release standard. The psychiatrists who testified in
Leach were in disagreement as to whether Leach should be classified as "men-
tally diseased" although they all concurred in the diagnosis that he was a
sociopathic personality and dangerous. Thus, use of the phrase "mental disease
or defect" in the standard for release would invite disagreement among ex-
perts over a question of nomenclature, and would perpetuate a source of con-
fusion which had provoked serious criticism of the Durham formula itself.2 1'0
The Court of Appeals subsequently amended its Leach opinion by deleting
"mental disease or defect" and substituting the words "abnormal mental con-
dition." 2°1 The revised standard governing release reads as follows:
There must be freedom from abnormal mental condition as would make
the individual dangerous to himself or the community in the reasonably
foreseeable future.
20 2
The phrase "abnormal mental condition" was obviously chosen with metic-
ulous care, and was manifestly designed to reach the case of a sociopath
acquitted on grounds of insanity who, though "sane" and not mentally diseased
in the terminology of some specialists, may suffer from an emotional disorder
which makes him dangerous. Indeed, "abnormal mental condition" is a suffi-
ciently comprehensive standard to reach all types of mental disorders. Thus,
in one recent case, release was denied to a person diagnosed as suffering from
a "psychoneurotic reaction, obsessive compulsive reaction." In the opinion of
one psychiatrist, the patient would have been "dangerous to society because
of his checkwriting proclivity" were he released.203
199. Opinion of Court entered July 10, 1958, Overholser v. Leach, No. 14,480, D.C.
Cir. (not reported).
200. See text at notes 142-48 supra.
201. Order, Overholser v. Leach, No. 14,480, D.C. Cir., Sept. 18, 1958; 25 J.D.C. BAr
Ass'N 582 (1958).
202. Order, supra note 201. (Emphasis added.)
203. Overholser v. Russell, 283 F.2d 195 (1960).
[Vol. 70 :905
DURHAM RULE
By construing the statute to require proof of freedom from an "abnormal
mental condition" as a precondition to release, the Court of Appeals signifi-
cantly broadened the class of persons who can be detained from among those
found not guilty by reason of insanity. The court made it possible to confine
persons who are "sane" in the colloquial sense, e.g., sociopaths and those
suffering from psychoneurotic disorders. But on what theory can a "sane"
person be detained in a mental institution, even assuming that he suffers from
an "abnormal mental condition" and that he would be dangerous if released?
The Court of Appeals has reasoned that such persons are in an "exceptional
class"-they are "people who have committed acts forbidden by law, who have
obtained verdicts of 'not guilty by reason of insanity', and who have been
committed to a mental institution pursuant to the [mandatory commitment
statute]."204 The shortcoming of this response is that hospitalization of per-
sons acquitted by reason of insanity is not intended as punishment-it is de-
signed for treatment and rehabilitation 20 5-and to detain a "sane" person in
a mental institution is plainly punitive. In addition, the argument that such
persons can be confined to protect the public because they may be potentially
dangerous will not withstand the slightest scrutiny. To deprive a person of
liberty because of "evil or criminal propensities he may be thought to have"
would offend due process; it "would transform the hospital into a penitentiary
where one could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense."20 6 A defendant
found guilty and imprisoned cannot be futher detained after he has served
his sentence, even though there may be every indication that he will repeat
his antisocial behavior following release.20 7
Various solutions have been proposed for this problem. It has been sug-
gested that under the statutory standard for release--"dangerousness to him-
self or others" in the reasonable future-the government should be unable to
detain a defendant acquitted on insanity grounds if it cannot prove that there
is a reasonable likelihood that upon his release from hospitalization he will
engage in an offense involving physical danger to persons or property.208 In
other words, greater leniency would be shown to those acquitted of petty or
nonviolent offenses by reason of insanity. Thus, a defendant found not guilty
of a shoplifting or a bad check charge because of a mental disease would be
released, after a brief period of observation, if he were then of sound mind,
even though there might be expert testimony that he would probably engage in
204. Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667, 669-70 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 1013 (1959).
205. "'Rehabilitation' and 'restoration to usefulness': These considerations have been
prime movers in the development of our present law of criminal insanity .... ." Overholser
v. Lynch, No. 15,859, D.C. Cir., Jan. 26, 1961, at 7-8.
206. Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Fahy, J., concurr-
ing).
207. See In re Williams, 157 F. Supp. 871, 876 (D.D.C. 1958).
208. Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 945, 950-51 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Fahy, J., con-
curring) ; Overholser v. Lynch, No. 15,859, D.C. Cir., Jan. 26, 1961 (Fahy, J., dissenting).
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the same unlawful conduct once he was discharged. The principal technical
difficulty with this thesis is that Congress directed mandatory commitment of
all persons acquitted by reason of insanity for any "offense," without qualifica-
tion; the release statute, apart from its use of the term "dangerous," does not
classify or differentiate among different types of offenses as a standard of
release. Moreover, this view would sanction continued confinement in a mental
institution of the "sane" offender who predictably would engage in dangerous
conduct if he were discharged from the hospital.
It has also been suggested that Congress should amend the statute to pro-
vide for release simply upon proof that the party has recovered his sanity2 00
This solution, however, simply bypasses the danger of abuse of the insanity
defense under a broad rule such as Durham; it would result in the discharge
of all individuals acquitted on grounds of insanity who are not psychotic.
Sociopaths and individuals suffering from psychoneurotic disorders-who are
not considered "insane"-could not be detained even if dangerous to them-
selves or others. This proposal could result in precisely the abuse of the in-
sanity defense which the present release statute was designed to prevent, and
it could result in seriously discrediting the insanity defense in the public mind.
The test of continued detention could be made equivalent with the standard
for involuntary civil commitment, i.e., a person must be shown to be "insane
or of unsound mind," incapable of managing his affairs, dangerous if left at
large, and "a fit subject for treatment. ' 21 0 Under this test, however, non-
psychotic defendants are frequently committed-for example, homicidal and
suicidal persons. Acceptance of this standard, therefore, would not necessarily
lead to release of all persons diagnosed to be nonpsychotic, so that "sane"
persons could be detained in a mental institution.
In short, none of the solutions advanced is free from difficulty. Any test
must necessarily reconcile the right of the public to protection from persons
who by definition have not been deterred by the usual criminal sanctions, and
the right of the individual to be free from confinement because of alleged evil
propensities, a notion fundamental to Anglo-Saxon criminal justice.
It is now settled in the District that if a defendant is deemed to be danger-
ous but is not suffering from any "abnormal mental condition" he cannot be
detained in a mental institution.21 1 "His dangerous tendencies must be at-
tributed to an abnormal mental condition if he is to be retained in confine-
ment .... ,"212 Conversely, if the defendant suffers from an abnormal mental
condition, but is not dangerous-for example, if he has not recovered his
sanity but is not dangerous-he may be eligible for conditional release. 213
209. See Goldstein & Katz, supra note 134, at 239.
210. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 21-311 (1951).
211. Starr v. United States, 264 F.2d 377, 382-83 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 936 (1959).
212. Ibid.
213. Hough v, United States, 271-F,2d-458-(-D.C. Cir. 1959).
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Summary of Procedural and Evidentiary Problems in Release Proceedings
The inmate who seeks release must discharge a heavy burden.214 He must
show (i) that he does not suffer from an abnormal mental condition; (ii)
that in the reasonable future he will not be dangerous to himself or to others;
and (iii) that the hospital superintendent acted arbitrarily in refusing to
recommend his unconditional release.215 The Court of Appeals has formulated
an exacting test of dangerousness which militates against release: "We think
the danger to the public need not be possible physical violence or a crime of
violence. It is enough if there is competent evidence that he may commit any
criminal act . . "216 Thus, the court has indicated, by way of dictum, that
a prognosis that the accused may engage in forgeries if released justifies his
continued detention. Moreover, it is not sufficient for the applicant to prove
his case for release by a fair preponderance of evidence. If there is a reason-
able doubt that the inmate will be dangerous upon release, the doubts must
be resolved against him.217
These doctrinal obstacles loom even larger in view of the difficulties which
an indigent inmate encounters in attempting to obtain expert psychiatric testi-
mony which will contradict the opinion of the hospital staff. It is obvious that
"the right to bring habeas corpus would be of little value to an indigent per-
son unless expert testimony were ayailable to him to rebut the opinion evi-
dence of the staff of the institution who believed he should be continued in
custody."218 The court has no power to appoint private psychiatrists to assist
the applicant; no funds have been allotted for that purpose.2 19 Recognizing
these handicaps, the Court of Appeals recently held that a person acquitted
by reason of insanity who seeks release from hospital confinement may de-
mand an examination and testimony by psychiatrists attached to the District's
Commission on Mental Health. 220 There has not yet been sufficient experience
to determine whether this procedure will provide applicants with the necessary
independent psychiatric assistance.
The exacting standards which the Court of Appeals has read into the release
provisions have significantly influenced tactics at every stage of a prosecution.
Some defendants have elected not to seek a pretrial competency examination,
or have resisted a prosecution motion for such a test, because of the fear that
the psychiatric report will include an opinion as to their mental condition at
214. The hospital authorities are conservative about recommending release because of
concern over public criticism in the event that the defendant commits another offense. The
superintendent of St. Elizabeths Hospital has stated that, "In the case of persons who have
been arrested, particularly if charged with serious offenses, a greater degree of conser-
vatism must be practiced in the matter of release, in consideration of the attitudes of the
public." Overholser, The Present Status of Problems of Release of Patients from Mental
Hospitals, 29 PsYcHiATRIc QUARTERLY 372 (1955).
215. Overholser v. Russell, 283 F.2d 195, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
216. Id. at 198; see Goldstein & Katz, supra note 134, at 235.
217. Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
218. DeMarcos v. Overholser, 137 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
219. Ibid.
220. Curry v. Overholser, No. 15,848, D.C. Cir., Nov. 23, 1960.
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the time of the offense, with the consequent possibility of a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity followed by hospital confinement for an indefinite
period. Some baseless insanity pleas may have been eliminated but it is also
likely that some defendants in marginal psychiatric categories are discouraged
from utilizing the defense. A sociopath, charged with a minor offense, will be
advised by counsel in most cases not to invoke the insanity defense, because
of the difficulties of securing a hospital discharge. Thus, the net effect of the
court's rulings with respect to release may be to confine insanity pleas to
grave offenses and the most serious disorders.
THE STATISTICAL EFFECT OF THE DURHAm TEST
The statistical evidence available to document the effect of the Durham rule
in the District is fragmentary and incomplete. The pre-Durhain data is so
meager as to foreclose any intensive comparative statistical analysis. To illus-
trate, there are no reliable figures for comparing the frequency of motions
for pretrial mental examinations or pleas of not guilty by reason of insanity
before and after July 1, 1954, the date of Durham. There is little doubt that
there has been an increase in both pretrial motions and insanity pleas since
Durham, but the exact magnitude of the increase is unknown.
The available statistics show the following:
First. Although there has been an increase in the number of acquittals by
reason of insanity since Durham, the number of acquittals on this ground is
still relatively negligible. According to the Superintendent of St. Elizabeths
Hospital, between July 1, 1954, and November 16, 1960, two hundred and
twenty-nine persons were found not guilty by reason of insanity and com-
mitted to the hospital.22' As shown by the chart set out in the margin,222 in
1953, the year preceding Durham, 2103 persons were named defendants in
criminal proceedings in the District. Only three individuals, or .023 per cent,
were found not guilty by reason of insanity. In 1958, five years after Durham,
seventeen out of a total of 1714 defendants, or 1.33 per cent, were acquitted
on insanity grounds. There was a slight increase in 1959 in the percentage
of defendants acquitted on insanity grounds.
In the five years between 1954 and 1959, there were only 90 acquittals
because of insanity. During this period approximately 10,000 persons were
charged in the District with criminal violations. In other words, approximate-
ly 1 per cent of all defendants have been found not guilty for insanity reasons.
These figures do not include cases which have been abandoned by the prose-
cution because the government felt that it could not effectively rebut the in-
sanity defense. But even with appropriate allowance for such cases, it is clear
that only a handful of defendants have been exempted from criminal respon-
sibility under the Durham test.
Second. The available evidence is still much too limited to permit any
definitive conclusions with respect to the rate of recidivism among persons




who hare been hospitalized, treated, and then released. 223 Of the 90 persons
acquitted by reason of insanity between 19.54 and 1959, 25 had been granted
222. Disposition of defendants in United States District Court for District of Colum-




0- 0~~ U z
1951 1936 1374 562 0
1952 1692 1261 428 3 .23
1953 2103 1539 561 3 .19
1954 1932 1427 498 7 .49
1955 1416 1150 256 10 .86
1956 1650 1219 415 14 1.14
1957 1517 1199 311 7 .58
1958 1714 1265 432 17 1.33
1959 1339** *** *** 30 2.5
*Percentage of those found to have committed crimes.
**Cases, not defendants. Some cases have several defendants.
***Figures not available.
Sources: The Washington Post & Times Herald, Aug. 9, 1959, p. E-5, col. 3.
223. Analysis of cases in which defendants were found not guilty by reason of insanity
(1954-1959):
The following table covers all criminal cases since July 1, 1954. Column 1 shows those
acquitted of crimes by reason of insanity. Columns 2, 3, and 4 show their status at St.
Elizabeths Hospital. Columns 5, 6, and 7 show what has happened to those finally released.
(Metropolitan Police records only are the basis of columns 5, 6, and 7).
o - I. , o
0 0
Thefs 8 4** 1 2d 0 E
Forgry 0 5 0 5 2 0 0
Crime < U) U P4 fl, 9 0 U U UU
Murder 16 13 2 1 0 0
Assaults 9 4 0  0 0 0
Housebreakings 13* 7 0 5 0 2 0
Robbery 13* 9 0 3 1 0 1
Thefts 8 4** 1 2 0 1 0
Forgery 10 5 0 5 2 0 1
Other felonies 9 6 1 2 0 0 1
Municipal Court 12 10 0 2 0 1 0
90 58 4 25 3 4 3
*One person in each category not committed to hospital.
**One died in hospital.
Source: The Washington Post & Times Herald, Aug. 9, 1959, p. E-5, col. 1.
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an unconditional release from St. Elizabeths Hospital as of August 1959, and
four had been conditionally released. Of the 25 permanently released, three
have been subsequently convicted of a felony. Four were convicted of a minor
offense. Statistics maintained by the hospital show that of the 229 persons
committed between July 1, 1954, and November 16, 1960, forty-two were
released unconditionally; sixteen were granted conditional releases; and six
were released by habeas corpus proceedings.224 The data suggests, however,
that the term of hospital confinement for persons who have been found not
guilty by reason of insanity is not substantially different from the period of




Durham and its progeny have had a tremendous influence on the adminis-
tration of criminal justice in the District of Columbia. The statistics, which
show only a relatively small number of acquittals by reason of insanity, do not
accurately reflect the pervasive awareness of the insanity issue in the District
by judges, prosecuting attorneys, and defense counsel. There is today un-
questionably greater alertness in the District to an accused's mental condition
at every stage of the prosecution than was true before Durham. There are
now more frequent pretrial psychiatric examinations; in major criminal cases,
a mental examination is becoming routine. Both prosecution and defense have
been spurred to more thoughtful trial preparation. Although it is difficult to
guage how successful Durham has been in improving the quality of expert testi-
mony, there is no doubt that under Durham, there is greater opportunity to
present the jury with information concerning a defendant's background and
mental condition. And for the first time attention is being focused on the dis-
position and fate of a person who is acquitted on insanity grounds.
In retrospect, the Durham decision emerges as the first step in a determined
effort by the D.C. Court of Appeals to reform obsolete and inadequate pro-
cedures which prevail where insanity is in issue. The court's opinions reflect
the conviction that mental disorder plays a more significant role in criminal
conduct than is generally recognized. A corollary is that in a number of cases
hospitalization and treatment may afford greater protection to the community,
and may be more just to the individual, than the usual criminal sanctions.
If the objective of the criminal law were only general deterrence, confine-
ment in a mental institution would serve nearly the same function as imprison-
ment. The outlook of a mental hospital differs, of course, from that of a prison,
but in terms of deprivation of liberty there is little to choose between the
maximum security section of a mental institution and a jailhouse.228 "[T]he
224. Overholser, Criminal Responsibility-A Psychiatrist's Viewpoint (unpublished
manuscript).
225. See The Washington Post & Times Herald, Aug. 1959, p. E-1, col. 1.
226. See deGrazia, The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. Cni. L. RFv. 339, 349-55
(1955).
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prospect of possible life imprisonment in a mental institution . .. may as
effectually deter as the prospect of ten years in prison." 227 The objective of
temporary protection for the community by immobilizing the offender is
secured whether the defendant is incarcerated in a prison or confined in a
mental institution.
But the crucial difference between treatment and imprisonment lies princi-
pally in the prospects for rehabilitation and reformation of the defendant. In
the long run, exponents of the Durham test believe, a defendant who has been
treated may prove less likely to commit criminal acts after discharge than if
he were imprisoned and released. Given the present state of knowledge with
respect to psychiatric treatment of criminal offenders and their postdischarge
behavior, it is difficult to prove or to disprove this thesis. But in light of the
appallingly high rate of recidivism by released inmates of federal prisons-
approximately 60 per cent are estimated to be repeat offenders-it is clear
that even if psychiatric therapy were successful in a modest number of cases,
it would represent a noteworthy advance. Durham may thus be viewed as an
experiment in collaboration between law and medicine. An extended period,
minimally a decade, probably will be necessary before the results can be
definitively appraised.
Even if it were true that there were no differences between punishment and
treatment in terms of general deterrence, immobilization, and rehabilitation,
persuasive reasons would remain for adopting an insanity test which was not
irreconcilable with generally accepted medical findings. If a criminal trial is
viewed as a symbolic process, appropriate recognition should be accorded for
expression of scientific insights. 228 Durham relieves some of the tension which
has existed between the legal and psychiatric view of man's personality.
One difficulty with the Durham approach is that the trial process is, at best,
an awkward instrument for segregating those who should be treated from those
who should be subjected to punitive-corrective sanctions. Many defendants
who might well benefit from therapy are doubtless imprisoned; and, of course,
it does not necessarily follow that those acquitted because of insanity by a
jury will be amenable to psychiatric treatment. Greater flexibility and use of
postconviction disposition procedures-for example, more extensive psychi-
atric facilities in penal institutions and more liberal transfer of prisoners to
hospitals-,would ameliorate some of these difficulties. Moreover, Durham and
the subsequent appellate court opinions presuppose that treatment will in fact
le given to individuals found incompetent to stand trial or acquitted on in-
sanity grounds. Recently, strong criticism has been voiced respecting the ade-
227. Id. at 355.
228. See Arnold, Due Process in Trials, 300 Annals 123, 124-25 (1955) who views the
debate between proponents of the Durham rule and its critics as another chapter in the
"ever present controversy in American life between those who believe in a secular religion
represented roughly by the psychiatrist and those who prefer an expression of moral values
in terms of a higher faith." Cf. Katz, Law, Psychiatry, and Free Will, 22 U. CL. L. REv.
397 (1955).
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quacy of the facilities and the intensity of the treatment which hospitalized
defendants receive at St. Elizabeths.229 Judicial efforts to reform administra-
tion of the insanity defense will be stymied if Congress fails to make provision
for adequate facilities and sufficient trained medical personnel.
Having said all of this, it is well to note that Durham and the more than
eighty opinions by the Court of Appeals have not disturbed the fundamental
ideology of the criminal law. Persons of sound mind convicted of criminal
offenses in the District are still subject to the conventional punitive sanctions.
Durham does not alter the traditional requirement that the accused be shown
by the prosecution to have had a criminal intent. There has been no change
in the doctrine that a jury determines whether the accused shall be held
criminally responsible by the community. In the end, the enduring significance
of the Durham decision may be that it inspired reexamination throughout the
country of the responsibility question, and that, together with the subsequent
opinions, it furnished an impetus to long-overdue reform of the procedures
for dealing with the insanity issue in criminal cases.
229. See The Washington Post & Times Herald, Sept. 21, 1960, p. A3, col. 1.
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